3 rd Polar Shipping Summit

1. 3rd Polar Shipping Summit May 30th & 31st 2012, London, UK

2. Background Erik Rabjerg Nielsen Education: • Joined A.P. Moller – Maersk in 1993 • Master Mariner educated • Sailed on primarily container vessels but also briefly on gas, supply & tank vessels • MAESTRO management graduate • B.Sc. Copenhagen Business School, Business Management. Positions: • Technical Organisation - Vessel administration • Technical organisation - Nautical department • Group Procurement Coordination - Initial strategic sourcing (Lube oil, Paint, Steel & Main engines) • Europe Line Management – Cargo stowage coordinator • Vessel Management – Centre Operations & Deployment

3. Agenda • Brief overview of A.P. Moller – Maersk and Maersk Line • Commercial attractiveness of NSR • Comparison of routes • Conclusion • Q&A

4. Heritage of more than 100 years 1904: Company established with one freighter 1928: First tanker added to the fleet 1959:Lindø Shipyard opened 1964: Dansk Supermarked established 1967: Maersk Supply Service established 1972: Maersk Contractors (now: Maersk Drilling) established 1972: Maersk Oil produces first oil in the North Sea 1975: First container vessel added to the fleet 1977: Mercantile (now: Damco) established 1994: Maersk Oil starts oil production in Qatar 2001: APM Terminals established 2008: New global oil strategy launched

5. Group Overview Retail activity Container activities Terminal activities Oil & Gas activities Tankers, offshore and other shipping activities Other businesses • 2011 revenue: USD 60.2 billion • Some 70,000 shareholders • Controlling stake held by A.P. Møller and Chastine Mc-Kinney Møller Foundation 1: Maersk Line 2: Maersk Oil 3: Maersk Drilling 4: APM Terminals 5: Maersk Tankers 6: Maersk Supply Service 7: Maersk FPSOs 8: Svitzer 9: Damco 10: Maersk Container Industry 11: Dansk Supermarked

6. Fleet and other assets 60 container terminals 1,400 ships 115 platforms and rigs 900 offices 1,100 retail activity + 3 million containers

7. World’s no. 1 container business • World’slargest container line • 2011 revenue USD 25.1 billion • Fleet of 645 vessels2.5 million TEU • Operates in 125 countries • +3 million containers • 42 new vessels 2012-15 0.5 million TEU • Investing in innovative, record-settingvessels: Triple-E

8. Be our customers’ first choice Organisation to deliver a superior customer experience Profitable cargo Beat competitors cost levels and never accept unjustified cost Maersk Line focus areas • Severe competition, industry is struggling to make sustainable profit. • Customer satisfaction • High Competitiveness • On-time delivery • Environmental performance

9. Agenda • Brief overview of A.P. Moller – Maersk and Maersk Line • Commercial attractiveness of NSR • Comparison of routes • Conclusion • Q&A

10. Commercial attractiveness of NSR • Can NSR present an opportunity for shorter transit time? • Can NSR present an opportunity for offering a cheaper product? • Can NSR present an opportunity for higher reliability? • The joker!

11. Agenda • Brief overview of A.P. Moller – Maersk and Maersk Line • Commercial attractiveness of NSR • Comparison of routes • Conclusion • Q&A

12. Comparison of routes – Transit time • Columbine Maersk • Vessel size 8500 TEU • 11.300 nautical miles

13. Comparison of routes – Transit time • 7.600 nautical miles? • Average speed 13kn? • 4 month transit window • 11.300 nautical miles • Average speed 13kn • Full year transit window

14. Comparison of routes – Transit time • Transit time in the traditional network 36 days • Possible transit time YOK-ROT via NSR: • Distance 7.600nm • Average speed 13kn • Days needed, including inspection etc. 26 • The NSR presents an opportunity for a shorter transit time during the “Ice free” period.

15. Comparison of routes – Costs • Sizelimitationon NSR • Ice damage (lack of repair facilities) • Emergency - evacuation options • Modifying machinery (especially if non-ice classed vessel) • Ice and extra safety training of crew • Ice-breaker assistance • Upgrade of navigation-, communication- and safety equipment • Actual cost of transiting

16. Comparison of routes – Costs * The above figures are only indicative as an example, and does not reflect a true picture of the full complexity of container transport

17. Comparison of routes – Costs * The above figures are only indicative as an example, and does not reflect a true picture of the full complexity of container transport

18. Comparison of routes – Reliability Present network NSR Repair flexibility Piracy Weather Contingency Casualty coverage Port flexibility Complexity

19. Comparison of routes – Reliability Present network NSR Reliability factors are more insecure and more dominant 99% reliability will be very expensive • Reliability is a key driver • On-time delivery +99%

20. Comparison of routes – The Joker • Freight rates! • Is a faster and more unreliable product, of higher value to customers, then a reliable slower product?

21. Agenda • Brief overview of A.P. Moller – Maersk and Maersk Line • Commercial attractiveness of NSR • Comparison of routes • Conclusion • Q&A

22. Conclusion

23. Conclusion • Shorter transit time? • A cheaper product? • Vessel size / Ice breaker costs • Higher reliability? • The joker! YES NO NO ???

24. Agenda • Brief overview of A.P. Moller – Maersk and Maersk Line • Commercial attractiveness of NSR • Comparison of routes • Conclusion • Q&A

25. Questions & Answers