Corruption in Croatia: A Short Guide for Visitors. Zagreb 19.Sept.2006. When?. Corruption: The six phases 1990–1995 War and Corruption 1995-1999 Cohabitation with Corruption 2000–2003 The Time of Compromise 2003-2006 The return to issue 2006-- War against corruption 200.
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Corruption: The six phases
CEE AVERAGE: 69%
Numerous surveys highlight the public perception that corruption has actually gotten worse over
the past year. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development\'s 2005
Transition Report: "Croatia was among the few transition countries (Hungary, Azerbaijan,
Armenia) in which corruption in 2005 was higher than in 2002."
Transparency International indicates in its Corruption Perceptions Index for 2005 that Croatia has
dropped three places from the previous year, which places it in the company of Burkina Faso,
Egypt, and Syria.
Citizens feel that corruption is especially widespread among political parties, in the judiciary, and in representative bodies. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 representing total corruption, political parties scored a grade of 4, followed closely by representative bodies with 3.9 and the judiciary with 3.8.
Citizens evaluated NGOs, the military, and the church as being the least corrupt.
Hospitals were among the institutions with the worst reputations. Agence France-Presse reports that 90 percent of Croatians feel that bribing doctors is not out of the ordinary.bribery, nepotism, and political patronage are a legacy of the former regime and the nation’s past.Numerous surveys also highlight that corruption is perceived to be widespread in land registration.
Dimension specific results3. Anti-Corruption Policy
The first challenge that all transition countries face in launching an anticorruption strategy is credible leadership. A serious anticorruption program cannot be imposed from the outside, but requires committed leadership from within, ideally from the highest levels of the state. Yet it is precisely the credibility of the state that is undermined by pervasive corruption, creating a potential vicious circle in which entry points for an anticorruption strategy are hard to find. Building a demand for reform amongst the general public through diagnostic survey work can be an effective way of convincing the political leadership that serious anticorruption efforts will win them popular support.
The third challenge is to develop a detailed diagnosis of the nature and extent of corruption in the particular country. Experience has already shown that domestic surveys of households, firms, and public officials can be a powerful tool in any anticorruption strategy. The purpose of such an exercise is to gain essential information about the nature of the corruption beyond the general categories analyzed in this report and to identify possible entry points (see below) into effective anticorruption work. The process of implementing surveys, running workshops, and developing a dialogue within civil society on the nature of the problem can play a major role in galvanizing support for an anticorruption strategy and building constituencies at various levels of the system.
Law on Elections in Sabor (LES: Zakon o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski drzavni Sabor,OG 116/99)
Law on Presidential Elections (LPE: Zakon o izboru predsjednika Republike Hrvatske ,OG 22/92).
Law on financing of Campaign for Election of the President (Zakon o financiranju izborne promidžbe za izbor predsjednika RH OG 22/94). 21.July 2004Croatian legislation
(1) Corruption. Politicians and parties may be tempted to give improper favours in return for political contributions. The search for founds has often led to corruption.
(2) Unfairness. Money may lead to unfairness and may distort electoral competition.
(3) Financial barriers against standing for political office. The health of democracy demands that members of every group – rich or poor - should be able to undertake a career in politics.
Contribution limits. Restrictions on the amounts an individual is permitted to donate.
Disclosure regulations. Mandatory declaration of the names of contributors to campaigns and to parties and disclosure of the amounts contributed by each.
Bans against certain types of contribution. For example, the regulation or restriction of political payments by business corporations, trade unions or foreign organisations and foreign citizens.
Public subsidies: Financial payments to parties or candidates from public funds.
Strict rules and limits of private donations
Limits to overall costs of campaigns
Full transparency of accounts
Independent auditing body
SanctionsRational balance of financing (public and private)
(1) Loopholes. Although contributions to political parties and to election campaigns are two of the most important and most direct channels through which money may be use to influence politics, they are not the only ones. Restrictions on the financing of parties and elections are likely to prove ineffective if other forms of \'politically relevant\' financing remain unchecked.
(2) Inadequate enforcement. In a field as controversial and complex as the funding of parties and campaigns, laws require effective supervision and implementation. Election law has been a burgeoning field of activity - and of profit - for the legal profession.
Un presidente de Mexicoentro cantando la letra de la anti-corrupcion y salio con las maletas llenascantando la misma cancionA president of mexico/began singing the verse of anti-corruption and left with full suitcases/singing the same song.
Corruption in Croatia, especially at high levels of government, is endemic¸and systemic. Officials typically excuse Croatia with the empty phrase “corruption is a problem in all transition countries”. The too frail international strategy emphasises “process” and “capacity building” – the passing of laws and the training of officials to, as one official says, “reduce the opportunities for corruption”. It is both naïve and negligent to rely on weak indigenous watchdogs like the USKOK, the Anti-Corruption Council, or the media and civil society, to stand up alone to the corrupt elite.
A dramatically different mind-set is needed. Croatia is not “just another transition country” but an inherently weak state with external and internal challenges to its very existence.