pre-incident indicators of terrorism events

pre-incident indicators of terrorism events PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 307 Views
  • Updated On :
  • Presentation posted in: General

. . Differences in Traditional Crime and Terrorism. Primary/Immediate VictimsPecuniary/Heat of Passion MotivesSpontaneityNo Preparatory Crimes. Secondary/Instrumental TargetsPolitical MotivesConsiderable PlanningSeries of Preparatory Crimes. Terrorism. Traditional Criminality. Major Findings of the American Terrorism Study.

Download Presentation

pre-incident indicators of terrorism events

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Presentation Transcript


1. Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorism Events

3. Major Findings of the American Terrorism Study Terrorist group members engage in significant criminal conduct en route to committing a terrorist incident. They are learning from us, just as we learn about them. They modify their behavior to avoid FBI terrorism investigations.

4. Terrorist Tactics That Emerged in the Early 1990s Leaderless resistance Use of the internet Website “hit lists” of potential targets “Fatwahs” All of which gave rise to “lone wolves” and “elves”

5. Despite These Changes A number of preparatory crimes have to occur to commit most terrorist incidents. They may be committed by fewer group members and fewer meetings may occur: But that may allow local law enforcement to be more easily alerted to the activities of a single individual as opposed to a group which may disperse the preparatory duties. If these behaviors are routinized, patterns of conduct may be identified that might allow early intervention.

6. Terrorism in Time and Space These behaviors probably occur in routinized temporal and spatial patterns. What are these patterns? Even the most rudimentary questions about terrorist group planning activities have not been addressed.

7. Background The American Terrorism Study began in 1988 in collaboration with the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center. The FBI compiled the names and court case numbers of persons indicted since 1980 to begin the project.

8. Authorization

9. Methodology Utilizes “official” FBI measures of terrorism. Thereby, accepting: The FBI “academic” definition of terrorism The AG regulatory definition when applied

10. FBI Definition of Terrorism

11. FBI Regulatory Definition of Terrorism Dictated and put into practice by: For Domestic Terrorism: The Attorney General Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations and subsequent editions (1983, 1989, 2002). For International Terrorism: The Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations.

12. Characteristics of the ATS Databases

13. Number of Persons and Cases

14. Data Collection Information on 75 variables: demographic and group characteristics, target information, count and case outcomes, conviction rates, sentencing data. Court case documents: dockets, indictments, motions, judgment orders. Temporal and spatial data: 285 variables relating to addresses of terrorists and targets, locations of preparatory crimes, and sequencing of events. Summary of each case

15. Oracle Database Schema

16. Proposed Structure

33. Pre-Incident Indicators Project Objectives Can we identify spatial patterns of antecedent criminal conduct that will increase the probability of successful early intervention before actual terrorist incidents occur? What are the temporal dimensions of terrorist group planning? How many activities are typically involved? And do these activities vary by group type?

34. Major Temporal and Spatial Dimensions of Terrorism

35. Project Methods for NIJ Project:

36. Project Methods for Current NIJ Project Select case studies for collection of data. For each case study, identify one or more terrorist incidents for collection of spatial and temporal data (not necessarily an exhaustive or even unbiased sample). Collect data using open source documents. Input information into (first Access, then) Oracle 10g database. Geo-code incidents to create spatial data using ESRI’s ArcGIS suite. Conduct spatial and temporal analysis by leveraging the power of the geodatabase using Intergraph’s GeoMedia Professional, ESRI’s ArcGIS, and Matlab. Provide trainers with a tool for educating law enforcement personnel on patterns of terrorist activities and provide researchers with the database for further analysis.

37. Collected 63 case studies for the period 1980 to 2002 from the four main terrorism group types using open source data Sources for selecting case studies: 1. American Terrorism Database contained information from 1980- mid 1998 at that time 2. List from FBI sent to ATS added period: mid 1998- August 15, 2002 3. Suggestions by members of research team and consultants Case Study Selection

39. Variables

44. Data Collection Results

45. Temporal Patterns How long is it from the time members are recruited into a terrorist cell before they actually begin conceiving and planning for an incident? How long do terrorist groups plan and prepare before committing a terrorist incident? How many, and what types of, crimes do they commit while preparing for a terrorist incident?

46. Temporal Patterns

49. General Spatial Patterns Conventional criminals typically commit their crimes within five miles of their place of residence. Sources: Thomas Reppetto, Residential Crime, 1974; Richard Wright and Scott Decker, Burglars on the Job, 1996; Richard Wright and Scott Decker, Armed Robbers in Action, 1997. Do terrorists reflect similar patterns of behavior?

50. General Spatial Patterns Major terrorist incidents in the U.S. typically involved perpetrators from places other than the site of the target.

53. Distances from Terrorist Residences to Incident Locations What do zero distances indicate?What do zero distances indicate?

54. Distances from Terrorist Residences to Incident Locations % all international single left right 10 2.729 3.6648 2.1946 2.2043 0 20 7.7759 7.9015 3.2035 3.6643 16.585 30 11.476 10.696 21.777 5.6801 37.712 40 15.991 13.522 27.222 9.1346 70.37 50 78.825 48.031 78.545 14.903 102.83 60 262.21 289.14 164.29 121.26 340.14 70 735.54 1083.2 308.66 178.38 457.47 80 1083.4 1084.5 800.82 212.16 716.43 90 1094.3 1094.6 1479.8 308.12 735.54 100 2569.8 1098 2569.8 2133.5 876.72 % all international single left right 10 2.729 3.6648 2.1946 2.2043 0 20 7.7759 7.9015 3.2035 3.6643 16.585 30 11.476 10.696 21.777 5.6801 37.712 40 15.991 13.522 27.222 9.1346 70.37 50 78.825 48.031 78.545 14.903 102.83 60 262.21 289.14 164.29 121.26 340.14 70 735.54 1083.2 308.66 178.38 457.47 80 1083.4 1084.5 800.82 212.16 716.43 90 1094.3 1094.6 1479.8 308.12 735.54 100 2569.8 1098 2569.8 2133.5 876.72

59. Breakdown of Ancillary Activity

60. Breakdown of Planning and Preparatory Activities

61. Residences to Incidents(data availability problems) This case is shown to highlight potential problems arising from partial data. Court records provide a single legal residence for mr. kazinski throughout his mailing campaign. However, it is suspected, or at least possible, that he traveled to or near to the locations of the addressed packages. The public court records did not contain information about the postmark on the packages. If this information was available, it is very likely in the FBI records, we would treat the travel as a preparatory or planning activity and that information would be captured and analyzed. As is, this case is considered an outlier and not used in the majority of the analysis. This case is shown to highlight potential problems arising from partial data. Court records provide a single legal residence for mr. kazinski throughout his mailing campaign. However, it is suspected, or at least possible, that he traveled to or near to the locations of the addressed packages. The public court records did not contain information about the postmark on the packages. If this information was available, it is very likely in the FBI records, we would treat the travel as a preparatory or planning activity and that information would be captured and analyzed. As is, this case is considered an outlier and not used in the majority of the analysis.

62. For More Information: Brent L. Smith- Professor and Director Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College Old Main 211, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701 [email protected] 479-575-3401 Kelly R. Damphousse- Associate Dean College of Arts & Sciences 633 Elm Ave, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma 73019 [email protected] 405-325-2529 Paxton Roberts- Research Associate Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College Old Main 211, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, 72701 [email protected] 479-575-4521

  • Login