Mh 18 victory in the pacific l.jpg
This presentation is the property of its rightful owner.
Sponsored Links
1 / 60

MH-18: Victory in the Pacific PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 184 Views
  • Updated On :
  • Presentation posted in: General

MH-18: Victory in the Pacific. MH-18: Pacific Victory - Strategic Overview Naval & Amphibious War – Operational Level. US Grand Strategy : still Germany “first” => but… political reality could not be ignored: Japan bombed US first at Pearl Harbor

Related searches for MH-18: Victory in the Pacific

Download Presentation

MH-18: Victory in the Pacific

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Presentation Transcript


Mh 18 victory in the pacific l.jpg

MH-18: Victory in the Pacific


Mh 18 pacific victory strategic overview naval amphibious war operational level l.jpg

MH-18: Pacific Victory - Strategic OverviewNaval & Amphibious War – Operational Level

  • US Grand Strategy: still Germany “first” => but…

    • political reality could not be ignored:

      • Japan bombed US first at Pearl Harbor

      • American Public demanded revenge on Japan

  • Result => Grand Strategic objectives & priorities adjusted:

    • Pacific theater gets higher political & military priority

  • Also: setting strategic priorities forced leadership:

    • Allocate scarce resources among competing CINCs

      • (i.e. forces, logistics and supplies)

      • Not => best strategic objective or COAto pursue (CINC personalities)

  • Result: logistics and politicalconsiderations drive=>

    • Allied Strategy => producing ad hoc strategic approach =>

    • “Dueling” operational strategies in Central & SW Pacific

      • US called them “complementing strategies;” Brits called them competing


Strategic opportunity vs limited resources l.jpg

Strategic Opportunity vs. Limited Resources

  • Following Battle of Midway (June 1942)=>

    • CINCPAC (Nimitz) still left with only limited resources

    • A Major limitation for prosecuting war in Pacific theater

    • Only able to assign 1 UMSC division to secure Guadalcanal

    • PACFLT ships barely able to protect Australian LOCs

  • Later US mobilization expanded MPN & logistics=>

    • Made sufficient forces available to Pacific (by latter half of war)

    • Enabled US to pursue & adequately support:

      • 2 separate pronged strategies led by MacArthur (SW) & Nimitz (Central)

  • As Pacific War was fought =>

    • Number of ships sunk surpassed all previous conflicts

    • Combined Air/Sea/Landops accelerated toward the War’s end

  • But what would finally put an end to the war with Japan?


South pacific august 42 december 43 guadalcanal l.jpg

South Pacific (August’42-December’43)Guadalcanal

  • Navy & USMC conducted operations in South Pacific =>

    • Specifically in the Solomon Islands=> at Guadalcanal

  • USMC continued to defend against escalating assaults

    • Japanese conducted wave upon wave of frontal assaults

    • Suffered horrendous casualties in process

    • 15K killed or missing – 9K from disease - 1000 captured

  • Meanwhile=> Naval battles also fought throughout

    • Conducted in & around Solomon Islands (Salvo Island- USN defeated)


Operation cartwheel l.jpg

Operation Cartwheel

  • Series of battles then conducted in parallel in SW Pacific

  • Background:

    • CasablancaConferenceof Jan 1943

    • Key issue: unity of command in Pacific Theater:

    • Army (MacArthur)versus

    • Navy (Nimitz)

  • Question: who’s in charge & whose strategy will prevail:

    • (i.e. Given priority for resources & manpower)

  • Macarthur’s proposed strategy?

    • Capture?______________in 1943

    • CJCS response?

    • Too ?__________ & ?__________


Fallback strategy l.jpg

Fallback Strategy

  • CJCS Compromise:

    • 2 pronged drive converging on Rabaul

    • Tactical objective: capture orisolateRabaul

  • Concept of Operations(Map):

    • “Bull” Halsey to advance up Solomonsto Bougainville

    • MacArthur advance along New Guineaeast coast

      • Attack New Britain

      • Then isolate Rabaul

  • Significance?

    • PACFLTemployed to meet political objectives (PHrevenge)

    • Cartwheelalsowould become model for entire Pacific campaign


Air power s role in sw pacific l.jpg

Air Power’s Rolein SW Pacific

  • Key role in Cartwheel & future Leap-frog strategy

    • Employ CAS for invasion=> troops establish runways=>

    • Used as FOB & Air Field to attack next island target

    • Then US starts the cycle over again for next “Islandleap”

  • MacArthur’s top air commander & strategist

    • MG George C. Kenney

    • Developed new & innovative tactics

    • What kind of innovative tactics?

  • Employed land based air to strike Navy & defenses

    • Modified B-25s w/8 50 cal MGs in nose

    • B-25s fly low level sorties against ships

      • Skip 100# bombs into enemy shipping

      • Big improvement over past USAAF ops against Japanese ships


Japanese response april 1943 l.jpg

Japanese Response – April 1943

  • Japanese successfully deploy 8th , 17th, & 18th Armies to SW area of operations from China & Japan

    • Then re-deploy 51st division from Rabaul to New Guinea

    • Magic forewarns allies of Japanese intent:

  • Battle of Bismarck Sea

    • MG Kenny’s modified B-25s make low level & B-17smake high levelattacks

    • Land based Air destroys Japanese troop transports for decisive Allied victory

      • Impact: loss of this huge armada, loaded with supplies and troops, ended Japanese hopes of retaining control of New Guinea

      • Also gains US Navy’s reluctant recognition of new Air Force (AF) tactic

  • Magicalso alerts allies of AdmiralYamamoto’s planned air trip:

    • Action taken by allies?


Amphibious campaign island hopping l.jpg

Amphibious Campaign- Island hopping

  • Macarthur & Halsey continue duel advance:

    • Conduct amphibious landings or isolate enemy at:

      • New Georgia, Bougainville, New Britain, etc.

  • Tactical & Operational objectives & strategy:

    • Capture Japanese built air fields (or build them on captured Island)

    • Occupy & stage for further advance up island chain

    • Skip & isolate heavily defended island defenses:

    • Close off enemy’s LOC instead (Illustrated byKolombangara)

  • Capture more air strips & “island hop” all the wayto Japan


Sw pacific island hopping results significance l.jpg

SW Pacific “Island Hopping:” Results & Significance:

  • Each seized island provided air/logistic base for next hop

  • Isolated Japanese units died on vine =>

    • Therefore it presented no more operational threat

  • Useful precedence established:

    • Successful operational strategy was used throughout rest of war for entire Pacific Theater

  • Allied buildup in Pacific & air/sea control enhanced

    • Success encouraged more support & higher priority


Central pacific campaign nov 43 feb 44 strategic aims for pacific l.jpg

Central Pacific Campaign (Nov’43-Feb’44)Strategic Aims for Pacific

  • Trident Conference (Washington DC- May’43)

    • FDR, Churchill, & CJCS establish strategic aims for Pacific Theater

  • Strategic aims included:

    • 1. Cut off Japanese raw materials

    • 2. Conduct strategic bombing on Japan

    • 3. InvadeJapan home islands & destroy military power

  • Operational Strategy:

    • Build on success in Burma, So. Pacific, China=>

    • Then launch strike against Japan itself


Concept of operations two opposing concepts l.jpg

Concept of Operations:Two Opposing Concepts

  • 1. Drive across central Pacific

    • (who’s proposal?):

    • Use Coral Atolls for launch sites (logistics, FOB staging, etc)

  • 2. Continue drive in So Pacific via New Guinea & PI (who?)

    • (“I shall return”)

    • But he needs Naval support in order to accomplish this concept

    • South Pacific Strategy- Halsey’s role (“MacArthur’s Admiral”)

  • CJCS compromise?

    • Balance two strategies –

      • Complimentary?

    • ADM King’s proposal modified– how?

      • Strategies converged where? _______________

      • To provide Sealift for MacArthur’s “return”

ADM King


Navy s key role sea power pacflt order of battle l.jpg

Navy’s Key Role- Sea PowerPACFLT Order of Battle

  • US shipbuildingon step by Summer’43:

  • Major positive impact on US Order of Battle

    • Essex class Fleet Carrier (CV): 27K tons & 100 A/C

    • Independence class light Carrier: 11K tons & 50 A/C

    • CV aircraft: F6F Hellcat

  • Commander 5th Fleet (Spruance) forces comprised:

    • 6 Flt CVs, 5 lite CVs, 12 BBs, 9 heavy & 5 lite CRs +

    • 56 DDs & required support: Oil, Ammo, Supply ships

    • Submarines had a special role*


Submarine campaign pacific l.jpg

Submarine Campaign- Pacific

Most effective offense throughout Pacific:

Submarine (SS) attack on Japanese commerce

Slow start at beginning due to number of reasons

Lack of leadership & tactical skill (peacetime COs)

Faulty torpedoes & denial of problem at BUWEPS

Resulting in self destruction of USS Tang

Once solved =>

Japanese Navy & merchants very vulnerable:

Japanese conducted no serious prep against SS threat

Prior to & during early part of War

No adequate staff or command level attention devoted

No convoy system developed or anti-SS resources

When problem finally recognized => too late

14


Sustained combat operations at sea l.jpg

“Sustained Combat Operations at Sea”

  • PACFLT dominated seas in & around Japan by Fall’43

    • USN Capacity & capability unsurpassed

    • Logistics, re-supply, & repair at sea unmatched

    • 5th & 3rd Fleet HQ staffs simply rotated

    • The Fleet itself was always at sea

      • HQ ashore planned for upcoming operations

    • Japan simply could not compete at this level

  • Fleetable to conduct opposed amphibious landings

    • Protect landing forces with air & sea power

  • Fleet also able to conduct major surface battles (CV air)

    • All the while remaining at sea indefinitely

    • Many sailors stayed at sea almost entire war


Central pacific strategy l.jpg

Central Pacific Strategy

  • The drive through the Central Pacific given higher priority

    • Especially by the Navy leadership & many members of CJCS

    • SW Pacific drive seen by many as based more on “political” considerations than strategic or operational priorities

      • (FDR wanted to keep MacArthur as far away from Washington as possible)


Tarawa nov 43 objectives l.jpg

Tarawa (Nov’43)- Objectives

  • Tactical & Operational Objectives:

    • Gilbert Islands were 1st objective of Central Pacific Drivestrategy

    • Target: Betio in Tarawa atoll

  • Battlefield preparation:

    • Inadequate NGF support

    • Poor recon (Photo from air)

    • Lack of critical Hydrographic Reconnaissance data

    • Reef ½ mile out from landing beach would block landing craft

    • Marines must wade ashore


Tarawa execution l.jpg

Tarawa: Execution

  • Lack of sufficient gunfire support & preparation = high casualties

    • Lack of proper coordination between landing force & sea commanders

    • USMC landing force come ashore to kill zone wading in head+ high water

    • Planners grossly underestimated enemy strength & defense

      • 5000 Japanese troops dug in with heavy weapons- pour it on Marines

  • Serious lack of adequate information about beach landing site:

    • Coral reefs ground landing craft far off shore

    • 2nd USMC forced to wade ashore – many drown w/heavy equipment & ammo

      • 5000 finally make it ashore through heavy fire, but 1500 are dead or wounded


Tarawa results l.jpg

Tarawa: Results

  • Bitter lessons learned

    • Casualties: USMC: 3381 (990 KIAs) out of 18,600

    • 4Medal of Honors (MOH) awarded

      • (3 post humorously)

    • Japanese: 17 survivors out 5000 man garrison

  • PACFLT concluded better & more up close hydrographic recons required prior to future amphibious landings

    • Underwater Demolition Teams(UDT) reason for being:

      • Reconnaissance & demolition


Central pacific drive continued l.jpg

Central Pacific Drive Continued

  • USN next month op was success:

    • Isolation of Truk(750 due west)

    • Precludes Truk’s use by Japanese Air Craft

    • Unable to stop US invasion of Eniwetok- Feb 44:

    • Luck: early US attack prevented Eniwetok adequate defense

    • Result: USMC lives saved due to earlier Feb assault

  • Eniwetok’s capture => Operational impact:

    • US now 1000 miles west of Tarawa:

  • Closer to next operational objective: Mariana atolls

    • Also 1000 miles closer to US strategic Objective: (what?)

    • ?________- US to use Marianas as air base to bomb ?_________________


Sw pacific operations linked to central pacific l.jpg

SW Pacific Operations Linked to Central Pacific

  • Two separate Pacific Drives continued

    • Mac isolated Rabaul & then seized Hollandia

  • Wakde & Biaksoon taken after Hollandia

    • Wakde & Biak’sOperational significance?

    • Within range of PI with American Aircraft

    • Japanesealso realize the significance of threat

  • Impact of friction & good timing:

    • Macarthur’sluck holds at Biak

    • Spruance (5Flt) attacks Marianas

  • Japanese immediately cancelled attack on BiakIsland (never to return)

    • Prepare to deploy Task Force to Central Pacific

  • Spruance’s attack in Central Pacific sets in motion new Japanese Operation: “A-GO”

  • Tactical Objective:

    • Decisive Battle in Central Pacific to destroy PACFLT’s 5th Fleet


Central pacific the marianas saipan tinian guam l.jpg

Central Pacific => The MarianasSaipan, Tinian & Guam

  • Saipan - closest major Island in the Marianas:

    • USMC 2nd & 4th divisions tasked to take Saipan

    • Army 27th ID in support

    • Also tasked to take Tinian following Saipan

  • Saipanwas defended by 32K Japanese

    • (but its defense preparations were incomplete & soon fell)

    • Op. & Strategic significance?

    • Saipan is now within B-29 range

  • US secured Tinian & Guam by July & early Aug after hard fighting


Battle of pi sea l.jpg

Battle of PI Sea

  • Spruance’s advance on Marianas & attack on Saipan has major impact on Japanese strategy

    • Forces Japan to dump Biak& establish 1st Mobile Flt:

    • 1st Mobile Flt comprises:

    • 9 CVs w/400 AC, 5 BB, 13 CR, 28 DDs

      • All units re-deployed to Central Pacific

  • Tactical & Operational Objective:

    • DestroyAmerican 5th Fleet

  • Spruance kept Fleet between Saipan amphibious ops & Japan’s Fleet

    • Japan forced to attack=> 4 waves of 373 AC strike (only 100 penetrate CAP)

    • TF58A/Csink one CV & damage 3 others (US SS also sink 2 CVs)

  • Result: Although bulk of Japanese Fleet escapes:

    • Battle has big Operational impact on Japan-what?

    • Major loss of ?_________ __________ ________ _______________

  • USN Fleet structure/coordination & power projection validated


Philippine invasion l.jpg

Philippine Invasion

  • King & MacArthur disagree over final operational strategy of Pacific war

    • King wants to continue island hop to Mindanao

      • (in Southern Philippines)

    • Then to make big jump to Formosa & China Coast (Map)

    • This is here “scouts & raiders” have reconned potential beach landing sites in China

      • FutureFOBs for Japan’s invasion

  • MacArthur continues to press for liberation of PI people


Leyte gulf oct 44 july 45 l.jpg

Leyte Gulf -Oct 44- July 45

  • Convergence to 2 prong drives=> both toward ?___________________

    • Key stepping stone to Luzon (main PI island)

  • Key events: Halsey conducts engagements off to east of PI

    • Destroyed much of Japanese land and CV basedaircraft

      • Forced Japanese to return to Japan for repairs & replace pilots

    • Halsey deduced that Japan lacked strong force in PI (wrong)

  • Japanese prepared for decisive battle with complex plan:

    • 4 separate TF to attack US force in waters off PI

    • CVs from Japan to draw US CVs away from Luzon

    • Surface Flt (BBs) to move through San Bernadino Strait:

      • Tactical objective: attack US landing forces landing at Luzon

    • Remaining Japanese TFto move thru Surigao Straits


Leyte gulf execution l.jpg

Leyte Gulf:Execution

  • Oct 20: MacArthur attacks NE coast of Leytewith LTG Krueger’s6th Army

    • Encounters moderate resistance but 6th Army fights inland

  • Japanese respond but are spotted by US submarine

    • US Navy attacks & sinks 2 heavy Japanese cruisers:

    • This rattles Adm Kurita, Commander of main San Bernadino Task Force

  • Japanese A/C from Leyte attack Halsey (Princeton is badlyt hit)

    • But Halsey’s A/C find Kurita’s TF & attacks:

    • Sink super BB Musashi

    • Kuritabecomes even more rattled & retreats from PI


Halsey s blunder l.jpg

Halsey’s Blunder

  • Halsey sails entire Fleet North in search of more targets

    • Leaves nothing behind to defend Amphibious ships!

  • Meanwhile Imperial HQ ordered Kuritato return to fight:

    • Kurita now unopposed for transit of San Bernie Strait

    • Only few DDs & escort CVs between him & what?

      • ?_______ ________ _______!

    • But still able to harass enemy & prompt Kurita’s withdrawal

    • Very close to disaster for Americans (& Halsey’s reputation)

    • By Christmas last Leyte port taken* by 6th Army- mop up ops follow


Ominous new tactic revealed l.jpg

Ominous New Tactic Revealed

  • Ominous new tactic makes its debut at Leyte Gulf:

    • A serious new threat used against US in future battles

    • What is the new tactic used by Japan near end of war as a last resort?

    • ?_____________ ____________

  • Japan strips all available forces to reinforce Leyte

    • Taken from Luzon & Okinawa

    • Major future impact later


Luzon jan 45 l.jpg

Luzon -Jan 45

  • MacArthur finally fulfills his promise to return

    • Navy pays dearly price in process => why?

      • ?_________________ attacks on USN

  • Meanwhile GeneralYamashita abandons cities for mountain defense

  • 6 Jan: 6th army lands on Lingayen Gulf:

    • 4 infantry divisions => total of 175K men

    • 6th Armymarches 40 mile in 2 weeks thru light resistance

  • 29 Jan US makes 2 more landings:

    • NW & SW of Manila

  • Though Yamashitaordered cities abandon =>

    • Japanese Marines fight on to keep Manila

      • (Not in his Chain of Command)

    • Manila virtually destroyed as result - 100K civilians die & Yamashita is blamed for it

      • And subsequently tried and executed for it


Final campaigns iwo jima feb jun 45 l.jpg

Final Campaigns- Iwo Jima (Feb-Jun’45)

  • Background:

    • Operational significance of Iwo: Japan’s early warning

    • Also Japanese fighters based on Iwo harass B-29s

    • B-29s conducting bombing raids from Marianas

      • Suffer heavy losses without much to show for it

    • Also emergency landing field badly needed upon return flights

  • Order of Battle:

    • Japan: LTG Tadamichi commands 21K with 1000 guns

      • Strong defensive positions: dug in deep in caves and tunnels

    • US: VADM Turner commands Joint Expedition force

      • LTG Holland Smith commands Troops: USMC V corps

      • Comprised of: 3rd, 4th, & 5th Marine divisions

      • Armored amphibian tractors & Navy NFS


Iwo jima plans objectives l.jpg

Iwo Jima-Plans & Objectives

  • Strategic, Operational, tactical Objectives:

    • Japan: defend Iwo & prevent its capture

    • US: capture Iwo & use for B-29 emergency landings

  • Concept of Operations:

    • Japan: defend fm complex system of caves & tunnels

    • US: attack abreast on SW beach=> main effort to south

  • Iwo Battlefield preparation:

    • Japan: withdraw to mountain areas & await attack

    • US: Recon beach landing areas & NGF prep


Iwo jima execution l.jpg

Iwo Jima-Execution

  • 0935 19 Feb: 1st wave of armored tractors insert

    • 5th Div on left & 4th Div on the right (Map)

  • On left 28th infantry regiment turns South to Suribachi

    • Gains crest after 4 days of heavy fighting (plants American flag)

  • Main effort to North – slow advance of 5th & 4th Divs

    • Japanese conduct fierce resistance all along (red) defense lines from tunnel/ & cave network

    • Island finally secured after heavy fighting on 26 March 1945


Iwo jima results l.jpg

Iwo Jima- Results

  • USMC:

    • 5931 KIA/17372 WIA out of 71245 put ashore

    • (27 MOHs awarded – half post-humorously)

  • Japan: almost all defenders killed

    • 216 POW survivors taken (Korean civilian contractors)

  • US eliminatedfighter threat to B-29 raids on Japan

  • Emergency landing field secured

    • 2251 heavy bombers (B-29s) & crews saved from ditching

    • 24761 total made emergency landings on Iwo Jims airfields


Okinawa april jun 1945 l.jpg

Okinawa (April – Jun 1945)

  • Background:

    • Final land battle of the Pacific war

    • Capture would provide a staging base for air strikes and invasion

  • Order of Battle:

    • Japan: LTG Ushijima commands 32nd Army (77K)

      • Plus 23K Navy and Oki conscripts = total: 100K

    • US: ADM Nimitz overall Theater commander- ADM Spruance, CMDR 5th Fleet w/1200 ships

      • LTC Buckner: 10th Army (III & XXIV corps) 182K


Okinawa plans objectives l.jpg

Okinawa: Plans & Objectives

  • Strategic, Operational, tactical Objectives:

    • Japan: prevent capture of Oki as long as possible:

      • Inflict maximum casualties on assaulters

    • US: Capture Oki & use it as base to stage invasion of Japan

  • Concept of Operations:

    • Japan: defense in depth with main strength to South:

      • 3 major defense lines following E-W ridge lines

    • US: Land III & XXIV Corps & attack defense lines to North & South


Execution easter sunday 1945 l.jpg

Execution – Easter Sunday-1945

  • US: After heavy NGS bombardment, land 2 corps (2 div each) on west side

    • III corps proceeds to left & XXIV to right

  • Marines turn North & Army south into 1st defense line

    • Ushijimadelays counterattack until 12 April:

    • Awaited massive air-sea attacks on 5th Fleet

    • Counterattack easily absorbed by XXIV

  • MeanwhileIII corps overran most of central & North Okinawa

    • Buckner shifts portions of III Corps to southern engagement


Final assault results l.jpg

Final Assault & Results

  • 18 June Buckner launches final assault on 3rd line:

    • Buckner is killed by Japanese shell

    • III corps commander takes over

      • Declares Oki secure on 21 June 1945

  • Throughout numerous Kamikazeattacks conducted on the Fleet

    • Launched in 10 major waves severely damage fleet

    • Last wave launched on 22 June

  • Results:

    • Okinawa secured for base of operations for Allied invasion of Japan

    • Casualties:

      • 10th Army: 7613 KIA/31800 WIA

      • Kamikazes sink30 ships/damage 365 + 5K KIA

      • Japanese: 142K+

        • (including Oki civilians)


Japan under siege l.jpg

Japan Under Siege

  • Following establishment of base at Okinawa, Japan constantly under attack from air and sea

    • Duration: June-August 1945

  • The greatest direct impact came from land and sea based air

  • Curtis LeMay => introduces new Air Force tactic =>

    • From precision bombing to incendiary area bombing

    • Conducts low altitude night attacks (like RAF)


Strategic bombing l.jpg

Strategic Bombing

  • Strategic air campaign intensifies from Oct 1944 to Aug 1945

    • Tokyo fire storm kills 83K civilians;

  • Japan prepares to resist to end:

    • Prepares up to 5K Kamikazeplanes & pilots (300-400 launched/hour)

    • Also suicide speed boats with high explosives

  • US planned amphibious landing at Kyushu

    • Estimated casualties for invasion force => 700K!


Manhattan project l.jpg

Manhattan Project

  • Meantime Manhattan project successful

    • Proves feasible by summer of 1945

  • VP Truman succeeds FDR upon his death=>

    • Then informed for first time of Atomic Bomb weapon

  • Truman decides to use it on Japan:

    • On 6Aub45=> B-29 drops first Atomic Bomb over Hiroshima

      • 90K people die in huge blast

    • 3 days later => same thing over Nagasaki

  • The atomic genie is now out of the bottle!


Japan surrenders l.jpg

Japan Surrenders

  • Japan’s responseto Atom Bomb:

    • Japanese cabinet argued no such weapon exists until Nagasaki

    • Remained deadlocked over surrender

    • Emperor steps in and orders Japan’s surrender

    • Conditioned on his remaining in ceremonial position

  • Japan surrenders (Sept 2,1945):

    • Japan’s delegation sign surrender instrument:

    • Signed aboard USS Missouri (MacArthur presiding)


World war ii assessment l.jpg

World War II- Assessment

  • WW2 most destructive war in human history:

    • Cold War begins with A-Bomb always in shadows

  • War finally ended Hitler’s threat of world domination

    • Along w/Mussolini & Japan’s Imp Gov

  • From a tactical & operational perspective:

    • WW2 restored tactical & Op mobility to Battlefield

      • Tanks, A/C, ABN units integrated & employed for land warfare

      • Carrier Air for war at sea

    • Amphibious operations for power projection:

      • Island Hopping strategy in SW & Central Pacific

      • Amphibious Ops at great distances in Central pacific

    • Logistics/supply system allowed nonstop deployed Fleet


Assessment 2 l.jpg

Assessment-2

  • New technology & weapon enhancements:

    • Radar/Sonar & submarine warfare proved effective:

      • Enhanced Interdiction & protection of SLOC

    • Improved C3I & better operational control & coordination

  • Superior allied Intel collection & analysis (Ultra & Magic):

    • Deception & perception management

    • All gave distinct advantage to allies

  • Superior command, control, & communications:

    • effective integration/coordination of allair/sea/land =>

      • directed forces together toward common op. purpose

  • Superior mobilization of industrial might:

    • all above supported by unmatched Log system & MPN

    • War economy & industrial capacity & vast available MPN

    • All effectively directed toward national objectives


Assessment 3 l.jpg

Assessment-3

  • WW2 continued WW1’s tactical develop & op concepts:

    • Evolutionary process of improvement & refinement for:

      • Blitzkrieg w/tanks;

      • strategic bombing;

      • submarine warfare;

      • Amphibious doctrine (w L/L)

  • In contrast to WWI:

    • Destruction was much greater scale (civilian & property)

    • Holocaust & Nazi atrocities shocking

    • Strategic bombing killed 100ks- cities/civilian population

    • Atomic bomb => Nuclear weapons => MAD Cold War strategy of 20th cent.

  • Post WWII Cold War would make world bipolar

    • West versus East Europe divided world following WWII

    • NATO versus Warsaw Pact

    • Democracy & capitalism vs. Soviet dominated Communism

  • War also ended or soon ended Western Empires

    • NTL: relative peace (i.e. no world wars) to present

  • Although certainly “a hard and bitter peace” followed- JFK


Backup slides l.jpg

Backup Slides

(The Details)


Two separate pacific drives continue 1943 44 l.jpg

Two separate Pacific Drives- continue (1943-44)

  • British question efficiency of Two Drive Strategy- (why?)

  • US response?

    • Both drives mutually supporting?

    • Real reason?

    • (Macarthur vs King & Nimitz)

  • Brits response: mutually competing (scarce resources)

  • Macarthur’s advance in South West Pacific- (Map):

    • Op Objective: Philippines (leap frog over hard points)

    • Establish air strips for fighter escorted bombers =>

    • Protect & further advance west


Papua l.jpg

Papua

  • Order of Battle:

    • Australian 7th & US 32nd Divisions

    • Japan: 11K on New Guinea

  • Macarthur’s operational objective & strategy:

    • Defend & protect Australia & its LOCs

    • Control New Guinea

    • Deny secure Japanese basing in SW Pacific


Papua execution l.jpg

PapuaExecution:

  • MacArthur deployed US & Australian forces to Port Moresby

    • Then attacked Buna(where allies get bogged down)

  • MacArthur becomes impatient with lack of progress

    • Sends LTG Eichelberger to fix hold up

    • He swiftly improves supply lines & combat power

    • Improves food & morale

    • Brings in tanks to support infantry


Papua results l.jpg

PapuaResults

  • All operational objectives gained =>

    • US regains operational initiative:

    • Japanese driven from Port Moresby & US holds Guadalcanal

  • Buna captured within a month

    • Sanananda taken a month after

    • Several hard lessons learned WRT reducing Japanese defenses

    • US Casualties: 8500


Sw pacific drive objectives l.jpg

SW Pacific Drive- Objectives

  • Two separate Pacific Drives- continued (1943-44)

    • In SW Theater Mac’s Op Objective: PI

    • Mac’s immediateobjective: isolate Rabaul & accelerate his advance

    • 1st Calvary Det (1000 troops) assault Admiralty islands- specifically=> Los Negroes:

      • (High risk op- barely in range of CAS)

    • Mac is lucky: defenders concentratedwhere?

      • East end-=> Allows US attackers time for re-enforcements =>

      • Beat off Japan’s counter-attacks-

  • Hollandia (New Guinea)

    • The next target:

    • Tactical & operational objectives:

    • Isolate 40K more Japanese troops

    • Secure 3 Japan built air strips for further advances


Biak island l.jpg

Biak Island

  • Biaksoon taken after Wakde (325 mi west of Hollandia):

    • Wakde & Biak’sOperational significance?

    • Within range of PI with American Aircraft

  • Japan also recognized their Operational significance:

    • Prepare to attack Biak w/large Amphib & Naval force

    • Operational objective: preclude US air strikes on PI

  • Japanese strike force hastily withdrawn prior to attack:

    • False reports of large US Naval force prompts pull out

  • Japan soon assembles even larger assault force:

    • Prepares to attack Biakonce again:

    • Fortunately for Macarthur, what changes Japan’s mind?

  • Why do they cancel attack & deploy to Central Pacific?


Submarine campaign pacific52 l.jpg

Submarine Campaign- Pacific

  • Most effective offense throughout Pacific:

    • Submarine (SS) attack on Japanese commerce

  • Slow start at beginning due to number of reasons

    • Lack of leadership & tactical skill (peacetime COs)

    • Faulty torpedoes & denial of problem at BUWEPS

    • Self destruction of USS Tang

  • Once solved => Japanese Navy & merchants very vulnerable:

    • Japanese conducted no serious prep against SS threat

      • Prior to & during early part of War

    • No adequate staff or command level attention devoted

    • No convoy system developed or anti-SS resources

    • When problem finally recognized => too late


Measure of effectiveness l.jpg

Measure of Effectiveness

  • MOE: total Japanese Naval tonnage sunk: 577K

    • 1113 Merchants & 201 warships

      • (to include: BBs & CVs)

    • SUBPAC losses: 52 subs (22% of force)

  • Strategic Impact:

    • Major impact on Japanese war economy – why?

    • Interdicted vital raw materials (oil & steel)

    • Key reason why Japanese started the war in first place


The marshalls kwajalein dec 43 l.jpg

The Marshalls: Kwajalein (Dec’43)

  • Following Tarawa => Marshall Island group next:

    • TF58 (Mitscher) & Adm Turner (COMPHIB) invade

      • Six CVs, 6 light CRs, 3 BBs plus SS screen & amphibs

    • Target: Kwajalein Atoll(Map)

    • 8000 Japanese defended (but mostly admin personnel)

  • US invasion success

    • (Thanks toTarawa’s L/L)

    • Several improvements in combat hydro recon made (UDT)

    • Extensive NGF support prep

    • Improved C3 & coordination between USMC & Navy


Hollandia s execution l.jpg

Hollandia’sexecution

  • MG Eichelberger achieves tactical surprise w/2 infantry divisions

    • Japan responds by landing 18th Army:

      • Inflict 9K US casualties

    • CV air attack Japanese ships

    • But within month => Japanese demoralized troops withdraw

    • US now has 3 more airstrips to support its advance

  • Wakde& its airstrip successfully taken late May:

    • Wakde 150 mile west off New Guinea- (see Map)


Saipan s execution l.jpg

Saipan’s Execution

  • Nimitz insists that 5th Flt attacksSaipan before Japan’s defense completed

  • LTG Smith USMC attack w/2nd, 4th & 27th Inf. 20K complies

    • Sharp bitter fighting ensues & Japanese resist

    • Japanese eventually pushed to north side of Island

    • Then Japanese launch largest Banzai attack of war

  • Results: US 14K casualties

    • Japan: 32K KIA w/few survivors

    • Civilians also killed by own troops or commit suicide


Guam tinian l.jpg

Guam & Tinian

  • Guam & Tinianalso were slated to be taken:

    • USMC 3rd & Army 77th Infantry to attack Guam

    • USMC 2nd & 4th & Army 27th Infantry divisions

      • Tasked to take Tinian following Saipan

  • US secures Tinian & Guam by late July & early Aug after hard fighting

    • By late Fall => B-29sable to launch strikes on Japan


Battle of pi sea58 l.jpg

Battle of PI Sea

  • Spruance’s advance on Marianas & attack on Saipan has major impact on Japanese strategy

    • Forces Japan to dump Biak& establish 1st Mobile Flt:

    • 1st Mobile Flt comprises:

    • 9 CVs w/400 AC, 5 BB, 13 CR, 28 DDs

      • All units re-deployed to Central Pacific

  • Tactical & Operational Objective:

    • Conduct decisive battle & destroy American 5th Fleet

  • Japanese have a small tactical advantage over US?

    • Japanese tactical advantage? (Zero vs. Hellcat)

    • Zero longer range (but no armor/self seal=> vulnerable)


Battle of philippine sea execution l.jpg

Battle of Philippine Sea -Execution

  • Spruance kept Fleet between Saipan amphibious ops & Japan’s Fleet

    • Japan forced to attack=>

    • 4 waves of 373 AC strike

    • Less than 100 A/C penetrateHellcats CAP

    • Survivors fly into heavy AAA from new BBs

    • Radar used to vector Hellcatsto intercepts

  • TF58 alerted by recon A/C to location of Japanese CVs:

    • VADM Mitshner launches his attack at edge of his aircrafts’ range

    • TF58A/Csink one CV & damage 3 others

    • US submarines also sink 2 Japanese CVs

  • Result: Bulk of Japanese Fleet escapes:

    • But battle has big Operational impact on Japan-what?

    • Major loss of Japan’s CV combat pilots

  • Fleet structure/coordination & power projection validated


Leyte island assault continues l.jpg

Leyte Island Assault Continues

  • LTG Krueger moves 6th Army slowly twd Ormoc on west coast of Leyte

    • Japan strengthen defenses along mountain range (N&S thru Island’s center)

    • 77th Div land south of Ormocport

      • Captured it 3 days later

  • Japanese continued resistance w/ground & ABN attacks:

    • Combined attacks made to seize airfield at Burauen

    • But soon resistance ceased soon after Ormoc’s capture:

      • (Main port for Japanese reinforcements & supply)

  • Result:

    • By Christmas last Leyte port taken- mop up ops follow

    • Leyte => High cost to Japanese: most of 5 divisions lost

    • Navy & air casualties will also impact remaining forces on PI


  • Login