Area Studies, Comparative Approaches - Is a Peaceful Co-existence Possible? Or: Can or Should Area Studies Survive?

1. Area Studies, Comparative Approaches - Is a Peaceful Co-existence Possible?Or: Can or Should Area Studies Survive? Presentation at the Symposium of Hokkaido University Klaus Segbers, FUB December 9, 2004

2. Content 1 Causes for Re-adjustment 2 Current situation: conceptual tupiks, institutional ambiguities, financial dehydration 3 Consequences for scientifically addressing and organizing “areas”

3. 1.1 Causes: The New Global Context, 1 • Globalization (as a technological, economical and cultural process, not as a concept) • End of the Westphalian container state System • End of the Cold War and of the bipolar system >>> end of area studies by default and because of few political “deliveries” • Post - 9/11? >>> re-emergence?

4. 1.2 Causes: The New Global Context, 2 • More relevant actors, multi-level games, more games, more and competing rules • Reduced state sovereignty • New political agenda: How to cope with asymmetries? • In general: decreasing consistency, increasing ad-hocism of politics • With state sovereignty eroding and territoriality moving toward new centralities, how can we analytically cope with patchworks?

5. 2.1 Effects: Conceptual Problems, 1 • One important result is an outdated political cartography that has to be remodeled. • Concepts that are able to handle multi-level games, changing rules, actors‘ calculations and choices, meaningful comparisons are required. • Consequently, area studies have lost their previous status and have to be re-defined and re-shaped. • Areas as meaningful levels of analysis are disappearing.

6. 2.2 Effects: Conceptual problems, 2 There are classical problems related to traditional „area studies“: • The claim of uniqueness • The dominant focus on state levels, on consistency and governability (upravliaemost‘) • A strong tendency toward first plus high level lenses and eclipsing other relevant groups (minorities, middle class, youth, women, image producers...) • Metholodogical weakness • The insinuation of irrationality (media) • The apparent preference for Apocalypse forever and ignorance of „normal change“ (media)

7. 2.3 Effects: Marginalization • Funding for one-area, non-comparative programs and projects has dramatically declined. • The number of chairs for area studies has been cut by an order of magnitude. New appointments (tenure) must be approved by departments, also short of money. • In the fight b/w ratchoice oriented and culture turned research strategies most area specialists took a clear side, thereby marginalizing themselves.

8. 3.1 Consequences? • Formerly trained area specialists may react differently to these huge shifts in the environment. • They may choose a course of self-defense, maintaining issues like uniqueness, historical narratives and language competences.They may claim how important these qualifications are. • They also may try escapist and evasive strategies. • Or they may opt for the following strategies in training, research, institutionalization, consulting and funding, respectively.

9. 3.2 Consequences for training students • Students today must be trained in a way consistent with huge labor market changes • Students need as undergraduates a sound disciplinary basis, incl. theories and methods • This basis can be topped by specific knowledge in M.A. programs on areas or a second discipline or tools • Students must be prepared for life-long learning. Distant learning programs may offer new opportunities for area specialists. • There is a relevant and attractive job market for students who know areas, too – not only.

10. 3.3 Consequences for doing research, 1 • The question is not if areas may be studied but how to design relevant research questions • Before 1989: macro areas were huge IV‘s, allegedly explaining/ causing relevant questions (fp, econ perf, soc struc etc.) • After 1989, certain features of areas may serve as IV‘s. But in general, features of and phenomena in areas are rather DV‘s. • To avoid selection bias, cases shall be selected on the IV’s, not on the DV. This may, or may not, include specific areas – like cities. • Comparisons are ex-ante, not ex-post exercises.

11. 3.4 Consequences for doing research, 2 • Areas are not invariant. They are not “subjects”. • They have to be (re)constructed for each task. • They are shaped by globalization as the biggest “causal agent“. • They are not so interesting per se, but rather as playgrounds for g‘s effects, like accelerating institutional changes, failing and rentier states, violence markets, collective and resource conflicts, the redefinition of public goods, converions of roving into stationary bandits, shifting property rights, changing identities and imagineries, new security divides etc.

12. 3.5 Useful research guiding assumptions • We CAN understand/ explain „Russia“ or other places as good or as bad as other societies, given proper tools are applied. • Political processes may seem (output) irrational, but they are input-rational. • Politics are often not consistent and cannot be implemented coherently. Ad-hocism as a mode of action is dominant. • There are different relevant loa’s. And many relevant non/state actors. • Institutions/ rules are important. Institutional change is a highly relevant concept. • The old concept of transition/ transformation is not productive anymore. • The suggestion of designer reforms is romantic.

13. 3.6 Research on meso regions? • It then should be demonstrated that this unit is meaningful by at least one or two objective or perceptional criteria. • Compared to the EU it seems doubtful that it is a) operative (any functions or regimes on this level?), b) data generating, c) a perceptional unit and, finally, d) a productive loa. • As a level of analysis, it seems to be even more fluid than the nation states in the region. • It must be more than a normative concept.

14. 3.7 Consequences for institutionalization • It is increasingly difficult to show/ prove extra values by organizing „areas“ in specific institutes (at least in the U.S. and Europe). • Teaching programs can be organized by departments, research agendas by projects and external funding. Joint faculty selection is a good idea, but often difficult to realize. • Regional institutes are maintained when they can claim a political purpose (Middle East studies), include excellent individuals, or if they hold a brandname, even when they otherwise are not productive.

15. 3.8 Consequences for political consulting • Effective „offers for interpretation“ must be rooted in well-established informal ties. • It must actively seek working via the mass media and to shape public discourses. • It may – slightly – irritate stereotypes and offer attractive counter-narratives.

16. 3.9 Topics for political consulting • Governments‘ attitudes toward secular values (ME, CA, SEA) • Changes of rentier states/ societies (ME, RF) • Markets of violence (TransCauc, LA, SEE) • Failing states (Africa, EE) • Economies of drugs (CA, LA) • Conditions for investment (car industries...) (EE, RF, SEA) • Development of social capital (everywhere)

17. 3.10 Consequences for funding strategies • State funding for most area research has declined dramatically and will not come back (possible exception: Middle East). • Big TNC‘s often have their own analytical departments. • This brings area-related funding to the media, SME‘s/ associations, and traditional foundations, given that „area“ is the DV of a relevant question, or that there is an acute crisis. • Framing of questions is important (sustainable, inter-/transnational, transdisciplinary, multimedia, ...)

18. the end... http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~segbers

19. Wirtschaftliche Indikatoren

20. 2.6 FP’s Conditioning Variables • Permanent media exposure • Permanent elections • Changing domestic and European coalitions • Continuing multi-level games

21. 4.3 Conditions for a hegemon • On the first count, huge opportunities were missed after 9/11. Not many societies perceive the U.S. as benign. • A “acceptable” hegemon must meet one fundamental condition – as a hegemonic power, he must have at least a medium-range time horizon, and he must have developed encompassing interests. Is this the case with the current U.S. administation?

22. 1.4 Polisci and Russia after 1990 • Der Kollaps der SU führte zum Ende des KK. • Der Wandel der RF fand/ findet nicht im Vakuum statt. • Keine isolierte Entwicklung mehr möglich. • Zu wirtschaftlichem, politischem und sozialem Wandel tritt nation building hinzu. • Die Umfeldbedingungen sind gemischt.

23. 2.3 Das „Putin“-Phänomen • „Putin“ kann als Ausdruck eines neuen Äquilibriums gedeutet werden. • „Putin“ spiegelt eine relative Saturierung wichtiger Eliten- und Interessengruppen. • „Putin“ symbolisiert die Konvertierung von „roving“ in „stationary bandits“. • „Putin“ steht für die Interessen und Stimmungen verschiedener sozialer Gruppen. • „Putin“ ist eher ein Moderator als ein entschiedener Beweger.

24. 2.4 Zeithorizonte, 1990 – 2004

25. 2.13 „Putin“- Effekte: Zwischenbilanz • Es gibt eine klare Tendenz zu mehr Stabilität, zu institutionellem Wandel und kalkulierbareren öffentlichen Gütern. • Die P-Verwaltung möchte eher einen managed capitalism. Is das umsetzbar? • Dennoch – es gibt keinen gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Raum im klassischen Sinn, und das wird wohl so bleiben: Russland als patchwork. • Gewiss fehlt es an Ressourcen und Optionen, um ein autoritäres Regime nach dem Muster des 20. Jahrhunderts zu etablieren. Aber auch Chaos wird wohl nicht dominieren. • Es ist hilfreich, die RF auch mit SA, Indien und Brasilien zu vergleichen anstatt mit der OECD.