A survey of buffer overflow exploitation on htc touch mobile phone
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A survey of Buffer overflow exploitation on HTC touch mobile phone. Advanced Defense Lab CSIE NCU Chih-Wen Ou. Abstract. Buffer overflow issues on ARM based handheld devices (HTC touch mobile phone) Theoretical analysis and practical testing programming. Acknowledgement. 怡群

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A survey of Buffer overflow exploitation on HTC touch mobile phone

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A survey of buffer overflow exploitation on htc touch mobile phone

A survey of Buffer overflow exploitation on HTC touch mobile phone

Advanced Defense Lab

CSIE NCU

Chih-Wen Ou


Abstract

Abstract

  • Buffer overflow issues on ARM based handheld devices (HTC touch mobile phone)

  • Theoretical analysis and practical testing programming


Acknowledgement

Acknowledgement

  • 怡群

  • Collin Mulliner

    • Exploiting PocketPC, What the Hack! July 2005.

  • Collin Mulliner

    • BlackHat Japen, October 2008

  • Everybody and 老師


Outline

Outline

  • Introduction

  • Background

  • Programming

  • Evaluation and Discussion

  • Future work

  • Conclusion


Introduction

Introduction

  • ARM based handheld devices

    • Most widely used processor

      • PDAs

      • GPS devices

    • Mobile phone devices

      • Symbian

      • WinCE

      • iPhone

  • Our test platform: HTC touch

    • ARM processor

    • Windows mobile 6.0 (WinCE 5)


Introduction1

Introduction

  • Buffer overflow issues

    • Without social engineering

    • Computer compromised

    • String data manipulation without proper bound check

    • Memory corruption and possible malicious execution flow redirection

  • shellcode programming on ARM based WinCE

    • ARM assembler and disassembler

      • Visual studio with windows mobile 6.0 sdk

    • ARM instruction set reference

    • C. Mulliner’s work since 2003


Background

Background

  • ARM

    • RISC Instruction set architecture

      • 32 bit word (4 bytes long)

      • Separated Instruction and data cache

    • Register organization (user32/system mode)

      • r0-r12 are general purpose register

      • r13 is stack pointer SP

      • r14 is subroutine link register LR

      • r15 is program counter PC


Background1

Background

  • WinCE

    • Slot virtual memory designed

      • 32-bit addressing, 4G address space

      • Divided into 32 MB sized slots

      • Slot 0 mapped for the “current execution” process

      • 33 slots used for user processes (including slot 0)

      • 1 slot for DLLs

      • Others slots used for kernel

      • Memory protection exists ( claimed by C. Mulliner)


Background2

Background

  • WinCE

    • Processes

      • Basically no thread limit (by C. Mulliner)

      • All processes share the same 4G virtual address space

      • Only few slots can be accessed by a certain process

    • XIP DLLs

      • eXecutin In Place DLLs

      • ROM

      • Function addresses are always the same (By C. Mulliner)


Background3

Background

  • C programming on WinCE

    • Dangerous string manipulation functions

      • Strcpy, strcat, sscanf…etc

    • Excution flow control variable in stack

      • LR is designed for resuming the execution address when subroutine call is finished

        • (mov pc,lr)

        • Hard to change the execution flow

      • Actually in our test program, saving return address in stack is still used on WinCE, when issuing a further subroutine call and current LR needs to be save in stack

      • The saved return address is always directly loaded to PC

        • (ldr pc, [sp],#4)

    • Buffer overflow vulnerabilities may exist!


Programming

Programming

  • Memory analysis program

    • Show the address of global variables

      • 0x000140dc (slot 0)

    • Show the address of local variables in stack

      • 0x??07fe7c (device)

      • 0x1807fe7c (emulator)

      • Different slot

    • Show the start address of function exectest()

      • 0x00011050 (slot 0)

    • Show the address of function MessageBoxW

      • 0x03f7f720 (fixed in slot 1)


Programming1

Programming

  • Execution flow redirection testing

    • By directly rewriting the guessed memory address of first local variable plus offsets

    • The new redirected address point to a static link compiled target procedure in code segment because of leak information of :

      • Execution in stack

      • Execution in global data

      • Execution among unknown memory layout


Programming2

Programming

  • Code and result


Programming3

Programming

  • Simple MessageBox pop up Shellcode

    • Call MessageBoxW(0,0,0,0) by directly issuing a function pointer call from 0x03f7f720

      • ((int(*)(DOWRD, DOWRD, DOWRD, DOWRD))(0x3f7f720))(0,0,0,0);

      • 感謝怡群

    • 32 bytes of 8 instructions

      • “\x00\x30\xa0\xe3” mov r3, #0

      • “\x00\x20\xa0\xe3” mov r2, #0

      • “\x00\x10\xa0\xe3” mov r1, #0

      • “\x00\x00\xa0\xe3” mov r0, #0

      • “\xfe\x47\xa0\xe3” mov r4, #0xEF, 14

      • “\x8e\x4e\x44\xe2” sub r4, r4, #0x8E, 28

      • “\x0f\xe0\xa0\xe1” mov lr, pc

      • “\x04\xf0\xa0\xe1” mov pc, r4


Programming4

Programming

  • According to result of analysis so far and the finished shellcode, we can write a test program on our HTC touch phone.

  • To test executing shellcode in global data area

  • To test executing shellcode in stack

  • Both above execution are launched by rewriting the return address in stack


Programming5

Programming

  • Code: execution in global data area


Programming6

Programming

  • Code: execution in stack


Evaluation and discussion

Evaluation and Discussion

  • Injected instruction in Stack

    • Success(emulator)

    • Failed (device)

  • Injected instruction in global data

    • success


Evaluation and discussion1

Evaluation and Discussion

  • Executing in stack failed

    • Instruction cache?

      • Global data is much closer to code segment composed of instructions compared to local variable, which is in stack

      • Therefore, global data may be cached into instruction cache with other instructions (just guessing…)

    • Address range?

      • Any execution limitation of program counter?

      • Other possible execution limitations cause such failure

  • Found GS function on WinCE

    • __security_check_cookie

    • I will test it in the future


Evaluation and discussion2

Evaluation and Discussion

  • Programs on ARM based WinCE platform

    • Extremely similar layout between emulator and HTC device.

    • No variation of layout when re-executing the program

    • Easy to decide addresses of functions within XIP DLLs without changed (ROM)

    • By default, GS function always protects our execution flow from control variable in stack being changed by malicious craft attacking string

Good for security


Evaluation and discussion3

Evaluation and Discussion

  • Programming on ARM based WinCE platform

    • Once program are compiled without GS on.

    • Once execution control variables can be changed through buffer overflow vulnerabilities

    • Once there is at least one enough writable global data space, especially string( because of XIP DLLs, may not be necessary)

    • We induce that such kind of program on a device is dangerous for compromising


Future work

Future work

  • Vulnerable program threat analysis

    • How much possibility for attacker changing the value of control variable in stack

    • GS function

  • Well attacking execution

    • Execution in global data

    • Execution by repeated calls within XIP DLLs

  • Completely proof of concept

    • A vulnerable program

      • buffer overflow vulnerable program on HTC touch phone

    • A classic attacking string

      • Malicious craft attacking string

    • A practical compromising

      • Download and execution … etc


Conclusion

Conclusion

  • Introduction of ARM register usage and its operation during subroutine call

  • WinCE memory layout analysis on emulator and HTC touch

  • Practical shellcode programming on ARM

  • Practical shellcode execution on HTC touch

  • GS function found


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