1 / 5

GOTV

GOTV. Last time: the politics of appointments presidential role in budgeting Today: Get Out the Vote campaigning. Appointment politics.

aiko-perez
Download Presentation

GOTV

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. GOTV Last time: the politics of appointments presidential role in budgeting Today: Get Out the Vote campaigning

  2. Appointment politics • singleton administrators and senate confirmation: if senators’ and presidents’ choices are driven only by policy preferences, they should always approve the president’s nominee and the president always chooses a nominee at his own ideal point • reversionary policy implementation is some mix of office stays vacant and president makes recess appointment. If we assume that office stays vacant implies a spatially extreme outcome, senators will always prefer the president’s ideal appointee. Recess appointment implies president’s ideal appointee, “so resistance is futile”, to quote the Borg

  3. Appointments to panels • majority-rule panels: odd numbers imply unique median; even numbers imply median interval • if exiting member is not the s.q. median, the new median will be shifted in opposite direction of the exiting member. Median interval outlines the limits of how far a new prez. appointment can move policy • If pivotal senator and prez are on opposite sides of the new median, prez appointment is strongly constrained • If key senator and prez are favored by the median shift, prez is either partially constrained or unconstrained (and gets to move policy to his ideal pt) • if key senator and prez are hurt by the median shift, prez should be in a strategically strong position.

  4. Models of budgeting • Possible roles for prez include: • gate-keeper (negative agenda power); • proposer (positive agenda power); and • oversight agent (can affect the efficiency of policy implementation) • Gatekeeper: (veto threats) • asymmetric effects • Proposer: (positive agenda power) • Niskanen: exec. branch has hidden info about costs of policies, makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to Congress; Risk aversion and bias • Limitations on bias; sources of information • first-mover advantage and distributive policies

  5. Presidential budgeting • Evolution of budgetary structures • pre-Budget Act • post-Civil War: establishment, then breakup of Appropriations • progressive movement: “scientific government” and professionalization of government • 1921 Budget Act • post-WWI “retrenchment”; recentralization of Appropriations • 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act • Controlling deficits: the 1980s and omnibus legislation;

More Related