Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America
Download
1 / 37

Inter-American Dialogue Washington, DC, June 4, 2013 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 125 Views
  • Uploaded on

Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America Nora Lustig Tulane University Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD. Inter-American Dialogue Washington, DC, June 4, 2013.

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about ' Inter-American Dialogue Washington, DC, June 4, 2013' - afya


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript

Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin AmericaNora Lustig Tulane University Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD

Inter-American Dialogue

Washington, DC, June 4, 2013


LATAM IS THE MOST UNEQUAL REGION IN THE WORLDGini Coefficient by Region (in %), 2004 (Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008)


Declining income inequality by country 2000 2010 annual average change in gini in
Declining income inequality by country: 2000-2010(Annual average change in Gini in %)


Poverty 1992 2010 headcount ratio in
Poverty: 1992-2010(Headcount Ratio in %)




  • Special issue: Lustig, Pessino and Scott. Editors. “Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America,”Public Finance Review (forthcoming)

    • Argentina: Nora Lustig and CarolaPessino

    • Bolivia: George Gray Molina, Wilson Jimenez, Veronica Paz and Ernesto Yañez

    • Brazil: Sean Higgins and Claudiney Pereira

    • Mexico: John Scott

    • Peru: Miguel Jaramillo

    • Uruguay: Marisa Bucheli, Nora Lustig, Maximo Rossi and FlorenciaAmabile


Standard fiscal incidence analysis
Standard Fiscal Incidence Analysis

  • Pre-tax and benefits incomes

  • Allocators of taxes and benefits

    • personal income and consumption taxes

    • social spending: cash transfers and in-kind transfers (education and health)

    • Consumption subsidies

  • Post-tax and benefits incomes

  • Countries (yr of Survey): Argentina (2009), Bolivia (2007), Brazil (2009), Guatemala (2009), Mexico (2008), Peru (2009), Uruguay (2009), Paraguay (2010)


Results
Results

  • Wide variation among countries in:

    • policy choices (or outcomes of political processes?)

    • impact of those choices on income redistribution and poverty reduction


Government size varies greatly in latin america
Government size varies greatly in Latin America

  • Government spending is around 40 percent of GDP in Argentina and Brazil—similar to that of some European nations with larger welfare states

  • …while it is only around 20 percent in Mexico and Peru


Budget size and composition primary and social spending as of gdp
Budget Size and CompositionPrimary and Social Spending as % of GDP


Redistributive impact heterogeneous
Redistributive Impact Heterogeneous

  • Taxes and transfers reduce inequality by nontrivial amounts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, less so in Mexico, and relatively little in Bolivia and Peru

  • Boliviaand Uruguay start from similar Market Income Gini’s but end in different places with Final Income

  • Brazil has the highest Market Income Gini by several orders of magnitude but ends up with a lower Final Income Gini than Bolivia and Peru


Gini before and after taxes transfers subsidies and free government services
Gini Before and After Taxes, Transfers, Subsidies and Free Government Services


Direct taxes progressive but underutilized
Direct Taxes Progressive but Underutilized

  • Personal income tax varies from around five percent of GDP in Uruguay to nearly zero in Bolivia

  • In all countries in which they exist, direct taxes are progressive, but because direct taxes are a small percentage of GDP almost everywhere, their redistributive impact is small


Gini before and after direct taxes
Gini Before and After Direct Taxes


Cash transfers powerful poverty reducing mechanism only when targeted and of significant magnitude
Cash Transfers Powerful Poverty-Reducing Mechanism only when Targeted and of Significant Magnitude

  • Cash transfers reduce extreme poverty by more than 60 percent in Uruguay and Argentina…

    ….but only by 7 percent in Peru, which spends too little on cash transfers


Headcount before and after cash transfers
Headcount: Targeted and of Significant MagnitudeBefore and After Cash Transfers


  • Bolivia Targeted and of Significant Magnitude spends five times more in cash transfers than Peru (as a share of GDP) but…

    …because funds are not targeted to the poor, the amount of redistribution and poverty reduction has been limited: it is only slightly higher than in Peru


  • Peru’s Targeted and of Significant MagnitudeJuntos, although quite effective because of its fine targeting, achieves very limited poverty and inequality reduction because the scale of the program is small:

    • coverage of extreme poor is below 60 percent and per capita transfer is low (compared to poverty gap)


Coverage of direct cash transfers
Coverage of Direct Cash Targeted and of Significant MagnitudeTransfers


Leakages of direct cash transfers percent going to poor and nonpoor
“Leakages” Targeted and of Significant Magnitudeof Direct Cash Transfers(Percent going to poor and nonpoor)


Indirect taxes and poverty
Indirect Taxes and Poverty Targeted and of Significant Magnitude

  • In Brazil and Bolivia, indirect taxes wipe out most of the effect of direct transfers, and poverty is almost the same after as before taxes and cash transfers. 

  • In contrast, in Mexico, indirect taxes and subsidies reduce poverty further, because exemptions and informality allow the poor to pay little in the form of indirect taxe


Headcount ratio before and after indirect taxes
Headcount Ratio Before and After Indirect Taxes Targeted and of Significant Magnitude


Gini before and after government services valued at cost
Gini Targeted and of Significant Magnitude Before and After Government Services Valued at Cost


Fiscal incidence indicators winners and losers
Fiscal Incidence Indicators: Winners and Losers Targeted and of Significant Magnitude

Who bears the burden of taxes and receives the benefits from cash transfers?

  • Fiscal incidence by decile and socio-economic groups


Incidence of Taxes and Cash Transfers Targeted and of Significant MagnitudeNet Change in Income after Direct and Indirect Taxes and Transfers by Decile


In sum bolivia mexico and peru
In sum: Bolivia, Mexico and Peru Targeted and of Significant Magnitude

  • Although Bolivia spends five times more than Peru in cash transfers, because they are not really targeted to the poor they achieve little in terms of poverty reduction

  • In contrast, Peru’s cash transfers are very well-targeted but the size of the flagship program is small

  • In Mexico, the limitation is similar to Peru’s but less markedly so


In sum brazil
In sum: Brazil Targeted and of Significant Magnitude

The largely positive redistributive picture of Brazil has three main problems:

  • A substantial portion of cash transfers benefit the nonpoor

  • Indirect taxes weigh heavily on the market income poor and wipe out the redistributive and poverty reducing effect of cash transfers

  • About 16 percent of Brazilian social spending in tertiary education goes to the richest five percent of the population with incomes above US$50 per day.  


In sum argentina
In sum: Argentina Targeted and of Significant Magnitude

  • Poverty reduction and redistribution through fiscal policy are the highest in Argentina. Is Argentina a model of redistributive policies?

    • Increasingly relied on redistribution through cash transfers => pension moratorium

    • Pension moratorium: good for elderly women bad for incentives (informality) and problems of unfairness

    • Fiscal sustainability called into question: source of revenues such as inflation tax and international reserves are problematic


Thank you
THANK YOU Targeted and of Significant Magnitude


ad