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Politics versus Bureaucracy Analyze further this tentative chain of causality: (Pol+Adm) Institutions QoG (Corruption)  Eco Growth 1) Pioneering cross-country study of What Produces QoG La Porta et al. 1999: few institutions…(culture, traditions, geography) 2) Politics is what matters

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Politics versus Bureaucracy

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Politics versus bureaucracy l.jpg

Politics versus Bureaucracy

  • Analyze further this tentative chain of causality:

    • (Pol+Adm) Institutions QoG (Corruption)  Eco Growth

  • 1) Pioneering cross-country study of What Produces QoG

    • La Porta et al. 1999: few institutions…(culture, traditions, geography)

  • 2) Politics is what matters

    • Tsebelis 1995: a new comparative political theory (veto players)

    • Andrews and Montinola 2004: apply veto players theory  corruption

  • 3) What happens in the apartment upstairs does not matter: how the Bureaucracy is organized/recruited is what matters:

    • Evans and Rauch 1999


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Good press for ”political institutions”…

  • Quality of Government =

    • Democracy

    • Separation of powers

    • Veto players

    • Checks and balances

  • For both scholars and policy-makers


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Bad press for “bureaucracy”…

  • Quality of Government # bureaucracy:

    • Obsolescent, undesirable, and non-viable form of administration

    • Market > Bureaucracy

    • Niskanen: bureaucrats = budget-maximizers

    • New Public Management > Bureaucracy

    • States = ”steering” > Private actors = ”rowing”

  • Although the Effects of New Public Management are not so clear:

    • in OECD countries, probably positive

    • in developing countries, probably negative


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Now, Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy (Johan Olsen 2006)

  • Is ‘‘bureaucracy’’ an organizational dinosaur helplessly involved in its death struggle?

  • No!! Chronology of a come back:

    • 1980s: case studies on the importance of the State  Development in East Asia (Evans 1995)

    • 1990s: international institutions (World Bank 1997)

    • 2000s: expansion of theoretical + empirical studies

  • Bureaucracy seem to matter, specially for developing countries


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La Porta et al. (1999)

  • Pioneering: first encompassing empirical test of what produces “good government” or QoG

  • Necessity to look at Exogenous factors  QoG

    • No Economic Growth

    • What could be an exogenous factor?


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Factors  QoG

  • 1) Ethnic heterogeneity: mechanisms?

    • Governments become more interventionist  less efficient  less quality of public goods

    • Alternative?

  • 2) Legal Origin: Mechanisms?

    • Why Common Law > Civil Law?

    • Civil Law = instrument of the state for expanding its power

    • Socialist Law? It is an “extreme” civil law

    • So, the French, German and Scandinavian Law (as part of Civil Law) should be bad, but, wait a minute, they say German and Scandinavian are good…Why?

    • Is there a problem of “endogeneity” in legal explanations of QoG/Type of State?


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Factors  QoG

  • 3) Religion: mechanisms?

    • Max Weber: Protestant > Catholic

    • La Porta et al. 1997: ”hierarchical religions” worse QoG. Why?

    • Are they more ”interventionist” religions (”they like to tell people what to do”) than Protestant?

    • Iannacone and the ”positive” effects of fundamentalism www.religionomics.com

    • In Catholic & Muslim countries religions had excessive power and bureaucracies have developed from religious ranks (”clerk come from cleric”)

    • Is not counter-balancing power good? Aren’t religious good civil servants?


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Data

  • Good description of government indicators

  • Interesting approach:

    • Correlations between dependent variables (T.2). Why?

    • Correlations between in dependent variables (T.3) Why?


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Results (T.4-6)

  • Convincing results for you?

  • Some omitted variables? They don’t include “colonial status” and “continent”. Right, wrong?

  • Other omitted variables?

    • Not much of political institutions (democracy vs. dictatorship, veto players..)

    • Not many interactions: always ethnolinguistic heterogenity is bad?

    • Generally speaking, very few control variables

    • Maybe, better to focus on 1 dep var (instead of 15?)


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Coming back to political institutions…

  • New typology of political systems: Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory (1995, 2002)

  • Traditional typologies in comparative politics:

    • Democracy/ Dictatorship

    • Presidential/ Parliamentary

    • Electoral systems: Majoritarian/ Proportional

    • E.g. Persson and Tabellini…


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Sartori 1984: definition of political systems

  • Presidentialism:

    • Head of State directly elected for a fixed time span

    • Government not appointed by the Parliament, but by the President

  • Parliamentarism:

    • Government is appointed by the Parliament

    • One-party or multiple-party coalition governments

  • Which one is separation-of-powers system and which one power-sharing systems?


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Tsebelis’ Veto Players Theory I

  • “Veto players”= individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo of policies

  • Prediction: the More Veto Players a country has, the More Policy Stability


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Tsebelis’ Veto Players Theory II

  • Instead of comparing political systems according to their “formal” classification as Presidential or Parliamentary, we should look at their number of veto players:

    • Italy (where two or three parties must agree for legislation to pass) = the US, where the agreement between several institutions is needed to pass a law

    • UK (all power in hands of one party) = a presidential regime where the President and the Legislature are in hands of the same party


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Andrews and Montinola 2004

  • Prediction: More Veto Players  More Rule of Law

  • Theoretical inspiration:Madison (The Federalist Papers)

    • Institutions must be divided and arranged so that each may be a check on the other

  • The more checks (e.g. veto players)  the less incumbents may misuse their power


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A&M’s game-theory model

  • Canonical Prisoners’ Dilemma payoff structure:


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Empirical test

  • How would you test this theory?

  • What should be shown in an empirical test of this theoretical model?


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Interesting empirical test

  • Faithful codification of the number of veto players in every country following Tsebelis’ theory

  • Very good control variables: among others, Economic Development! (distrust those who don’t…)

  • Each vp +  0.16 increase in the 1-6 index of rule of law

  • They test which classification of political systems works better: the traditional Presidential/Parliamentary regimes or the new Veto Players one

    • Presidential regimes < Parliamentary. Why?


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Problems with the test?

  • 35 “emerging” democracies in around 20 years = 354 observations?

  • Other variables?

  • Legal origin? E.g. veto players only necessary in civil law countries…

  • Time of democracy?


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SQ

FOX

PRI

PRD

Low revenues

High revenues

Expected outcome under VP model

Actual outcome

More Veto Players  Better QoG?


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Median

Legislator

SQ

Cardoso

Less

reform

More reform

Expected outcome under VP model

Actual outcome

More Veto Players  Better QoG?


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Party institutionalization in ten Latin American democracies.


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Evans and Rauch 1999

  • What makes QoG are not the characteristics of the political system (Pres, Parl, VPs), but features of the Public Administration

  • Move the focus from the Executive and Legislature to the State Administration


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The ”Bringing the State Back In” School

  • 1980s: case studies on the importance of the State  Development in East Asia

  • 1990s: also international institutions (World Bank 1997)

  • Lack of coherent theory and of broad empirical analysis (e.g. Evans 1995: “Embedded Autonomy)


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Evans & Rauch 1999: a double advance

  • Theoretically: show the mechanisms that connect the State Administration with Economic Growth

  • Empirically: an original dataset on bureaucracies

    • 35 developing countries

    • Methodology: experts survey


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+ “Weberian” Administration  + Economic Growth

  • “Weberian” Bureaucracy:

    • Max Weber: Patrimonial Administrations vs. Bureaucratic (Weberian) ones

    • Bureaucracy = meritocratic recruitment + predictable long-term career rewards

  • Why is it good?


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Mechanisms through which WB affect economic growth

  • More Efficient (“better types”, more competent)

    • OK, but why Microsoft does not use them?

  • Longer time horizons (Rauch 1995: US cities)

  • ”Signal” to the private sector (=impartiality)


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Empirical analysis

  • 35 “semi-industrialized” countries

  • High correlation between Weberianess Scale and GDP/cap: 0.67 !!

  • Regression: WS trumps out or reduces the effect of traditional variables explaining economic growth (human capital, domestic investment)


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Need for more data on bureaucracies…

  • More within country and cross-country variations

  • Problems: neglect of comparative datasets on bureaucracies by political scientists, public administration scholars and international organizations


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Rothstein & Teorell 2005

  • “Quality of Government” matters, but we lack a definition

  • Economists use “good governance” = “good-for-economic-development”

  • Definition of QoG: Results of Government  the Procedures of government


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QoG = impartial government institutions

  • Impartiality in policy implementation

  • Focus: not on how decisions are taken in a country (dem, dict..), but on if policies are provided in an impartial way

  • Does policy implementation favour some people over others? Or is impartial?


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Comments

  • Which are the differences between (the new) Impartiality and (the traditional) Rule of Law?

  • Are “professional norms” impartial?

  • A faithful implementation of a discriminatory law is “impartiality”?

  • Do you prefer Evans & Rauch 1999 or Rothstein & Teorell 2005 approach to “good administration”?


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