Non-cooperative game theory: Three fisheries games. Marko Lindroos JSS. This lecture is about. Non-cooperative games classification Nash equilibrium Applications in fisheries economics basic game (Mesterton-Gibbons NRM 1993) stage games (Ruseski JEEM 1998)
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Non-cooperative game theory: Three fisheries games
Nature of negotiations
= 37 +3/(1-0.95) = 97
depends on all
On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters
Case 1: Both stocks having low intrinsic growth rate
Case 2: Both stocks having a high intrinsic growth rate
Case 3: Low valued stock has a low intrinsic growth rate, high value stock has a high intrinsic growth rate.
Case 4: Low valued stock has a high intrinsic growth rate, high value stock has a low intrinsic growth rate.
Parameter values applied for simulation
Opposite case 3