Social Mechanisms. What Social Sciences Can Learn From Natural Sciences. LORENZO CASINI [email protected] Philosophy, Kent Where This Fits in my Thesis What is causality in complex systems? Tentative answer : the link between prediction & explanation
Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.
DNA damaged bases, enzymes, chemical reactions, spatiotemporal organisation
(i) & (ii): “internal” - (iii): “external” (‘aggregative’ (Little 2005))
Some: everything happens in (ii) (macro-properties are fiction, there are no macro-mechanisms, etc.)
Others: there are social properties and DC (Sawyer 2004)
I dub (1)Issue of Emergence and (2)Issue of Intentionality
The dependence of the entity’s capacity to exercise a power on the entity’s figuring in a certain mechanism
i.e. entity doesn’t have the capacity outside the mechanism
E.g.: “fusion” (Humphreys 1997a, 1997b)
intentional character of social mechanisms
agents “intend” social structures and consequences of actions to conform/change these structures
intentional systems are ‘self-directed’ (Christensen and Hooker 2001),
‘self-organised’ (Atlan 1998),
‘autonomous-adaptive’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2007)
No reason why same cannot be done in the social
ATLAN, H. (1998). Intentional Self-Organization. Emergence and reduction: Towards a Physical Theory of Intentionality. Thesis Eleven, 52(1):5-34.
BECHTEL, W. AND ABRAHAMSEN, A. (2005). Explanation: a mechanist alternative. Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 36:421–441.
BECHTEL, W. AND ABRAHAMSEN, A. (2007). Mental Mechanisms, Autonomous Systems, and Moral Agency. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, 95-100.
BUNGE, M. (2004). How Does It Work? The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34:182-210.
CAMPBELL, R. (2009). A Process-Based Model for an Interactive Ontology. Synthese 166: 453-477.
CHRISTENSEN, W.D. AND HOOKER, C.A. (2001). Self-Directed Agents. In McIntosh, J.S. (ed.): Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 27:19-52. http://www.kli.ac.at/personal/christensen/SelfDirected_agents.pdf
ELSTER, J. (1989). Nut and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
ELSTER, J. (1998). A Plea for Mechanisms. In Hedstrøm, P. and Swedberg, R. (eds.): Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, 45-73.
EMMECHE, C., KØPPE, S. AND STJERNFELT, F. (2000). Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation. In Andersen, P. B., Emmeche, C., Finnemann, N. O. and Christiansen, P. V. (eds.), Downward Causation. Minds, Bodies and Matter. Århus: Aarhus University Press, 13-34.
GIBBS, R.W. AND VAN ORDEN, G.C. (2001). Mental Causation and Psychological Theory. Human Development, 44:368–374.
GLENNAN, S. S. (1996). Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis, 44: 49-71.
GLENNAN, S. S. (2008). Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003685/01/MechsCausesLMW-preprint.pdf
HEDSTRØM, P. AND SWEDBERG, R. (1998). Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay. In Hedstrøm, P. and Swedberg, R. (eds.): Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1-31.
HUMPHREYS, P. (1997a). How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of Science, 64: 1-17.
HUMPHREYS, P. (1997b). Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science, 64: S337-S345.
KIM, J. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
LITTLE, D. (2005). The Levels of the Social. http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/levels%20draft%20v5.htm
MACHAMER, P., DARDEN, L. AND CRAVER, C.F. (2000). Thinking about Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1): 1-25.
O'CONNOR, T., AND WONG, H. Y.(2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Noûs, 39: 658-678. http://mypage.iu.edu/~toconnor/MetaphEm.pdf
O’CONNOR, T., AND WONG, H. Y. (2009). Emergent Properties. In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, forthcoming. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/properties-emergent/
SAWYER, R. K. (1999). The Emergence of Creativity. Philosophical Psychology 12: 447–69.
SAWYER, R. K. (2004). The Mechanisms of Emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34: 260-282.
SILBERSTEIN, M. AND MCGEEVER, J. (1999). The Search for Ontological Emergence. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195):182-200.
SIMON, H. A. (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
WIMSATT, W. C. (2007). Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.