Social Psychology of Groups

1. Social Psychology of Groups

3. Social Facilitation Triplett (1898) Cycling: individual time trials are worse than races against others Expt: same thing with kids reeling in fishing lines BUT problem: sometimes people do worse in groups than alone So, social psychology drops social facilitation

4. Social Facilitation Zajonc New theory of social facilitation stated in terms of physiological arousal and type of task Yerkes-Dodson Law

5. Yerkes-Dodson Law

6. Arousal and the Dominant Response According to Zajonc (1965), the presence of others facilitates a well-learned response but inhibits a less practiced or new response because: The presence of others increases physiological arousal (i.e., our bodies become more energized). When such arousal exists, it is easier to do something that is simple but harder to do something complex or learn something new. Why do you think Zajonc used cockroaches in his research? Why might it be useful to find that something that is true for humans is also true for cockroaches (or vice versa)? Crowding has a similar effect to being observed by a crowd: it enhances arousal, which facilitates dominant responses. As theater directors and sports fans know, a �good house� is a full house. Why do you think Zajonc used cockroaches in his research? Why might it be useful to find that something that is true for humans is also true for cockroaches (or vice versa)? Crowding has a similar effect to being observed by a crowd: it enhances arousal, which facilitates dominant responses. As theater directors and sports fans know, a �good house� is a full house.

7. Why the Presence of OthersCauses Arousal Other people cause us to become particularly alert and vigilant. They make us apprehensive about how we�re being evaluated. They distract us from the task at hand. Other people cause us to become particularly alert and vigilant. Because other people can be unpredictable, we are in a state of greater alertness in their presence. This alertness, or vigilance, causes mild arousal. The beauty of this explanation (the one preferred by Zajonc, 1980) is that it explains both the animal and the human studies. A solitary cockroach need not worry about what the cockroach in the next room is doing. However, it needs to be alert when in the presence of another member of its species�and the same goes for human beings. They make us apprehensive about how we�re being evaluated. When other people can see how you are doing, you feel like they are evaluating you. Evaluation apprehension can cause mild arousal. According to this view, then, it is not the mere presence of others but the presence of others who are evaluating us that causes arousal and subsequent social facilitation (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Bond, Atoum, & Van Leeuwen, 1996; Seta & Seta, 1995). For example, individuals running on a UCSB jogging path sped up as they came upon a woman seated in the grass � but only if she was facing them rather than sitting with her back turned (Worringham & Messick, 1983). They distract us from the task at hand. Divided attention produces arousal. Consistent with this interpretation, nonsocial sources of distraction, such as a flashing light, cause the same kinds of social facilitation effects as the presence of other people. This (Baron, 1986; Muller, Atzeni, & Fabrizio, 2004) is similar to Robert Zajonc�s (1980) notion that we need to be alert when in the presence of others, except that it focuses on the idea that any source of distraction�be it the presence of other people or noise from the party going on in the apartment upstairs�will put us in a state of conflict because it is difficult to pay attention to two things at the same time. Other people cause us to become particularly alert and vigilant. Because other people can be unpredictable, we are in a state of greater alertness in their presence. This alertness, or vigilance, causes mild arousal. The beauty of this explanation (the one preferred by Zajonc, 1980) is that it explains both the animal and the human studies. A solitary cockroach need not worry about what the cockroach in the next room is doing. However, it needs to be alert when in the presence of another member of its species�and the same goes for human beings. They make us apprehensive about how we�re being evaluated. When other people can see how you are doing, you feel like they are evaluating you. Evaluation apprehension can cause mild arousal. According to this view, then, it is not the mere presence of others but the presence of others who are evaluating us that causes arousal and subsequent social facilitation (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Bond, Atoum, & Van Leeuwen, 1996; Seta & Seta, 1995). For example, individuals running on a UCSB jogging path sped up as they came upon a woman seated in the grass � but only if she was facing them rather than sitting with her back turned (Worringham & Messick, 1983). They distract us from the task at hand. Divided attention produces arousal. Consistent with this interpretation, nonsocial sources of distraction, such as a flashing light, cause the same kinds of social facilitation effects as the presence of other people. This (Baron, 1986; Muller, Atzeni, & Fabrizio, 2004) is similar to Robert Zajonc�s (1980) notion that we need to be alert when in the presence of others, except that it focuses on the idea that any source of distraction�be it the presence of other people or noise from the party going on in the apartment upstairs�will put us in a state of conflict because it is difficult to pay attention to two things at the same time.

8. Social Facilitation Michaels et al. (1982) 2 groups of subjects categorized as good or bad players Unobtrusive observation 2 conditions: play with vs without audience Results?

9. Should you play pool in public?

10. Social Loafing The tendency for people to do worse on simple tasks but better on complex tasks when they are in the presence of others and their individual performance cannot be evaluated.

11. Social Loafing Ringelmann (1880s agriculturalist) Coordination loss or loss of motivation? Ingham et al (1974) tug-of war study 4 conditions: Subject alone Subject + 1 confederate Subject + 2 confederates Subject + 8 confederates Supports lack of motivation hypothesis

12. Social LoafingWhy Do People Loaf?

13. Social Loafing People engage in social loafing depending on task difficulty and on whether they are evaluated individually or collectively. Williams and Karan (1985): 2 IV�s Task Difficulty (easy or hard maze) Type of evaluation (individual vs collective) DV: Time to solve maze

14. Social Loafing

16. Deindividuation: Getting Lost in the Crowd The loosening of normal constraints on behavior when people can�t be identified (such as when they are in a crowd), leading to an increase in impulsive and deviant acts. Zimbardo, 1969 Diener et al., 1976 Deindividuation makes people feel less accountable for their actions because it reduces the likelihood that any individual will be singled out and blamed. Becoming deindividuated increases the extent to which people obey the group�s norms. Deindividuation does not always lead to aggressive or antisocial behavior; it depends on what the norm of the group is. Johnson and Downing, 1979 The internet has provided new ways in which people can communicate with each other anonymously. Just as research on deindividuation predicts, in these settings people often feel free to say things they would never dream of saying if they could be identified. There are advantages to free and open discussion of difficult topics, but the cost seems to be a reduction in common civility. What kinds of experiences have you personally had of being deindividuated? What kinds of experiences that occur in our society tend to deindividuate us? What kinds of behavior have you observed that might have occurred because people were deindividuated? What are the effects of wearing uniforms? If you could be totally invisible for 24 hours and were completely assured that you would not be detected or held responsible for your actions, what would you do? (Mann, 1981) More suicide baiting at night, larger crowds, moderate distance to victim. (Zimbardo, 1969) Participants who wore white hoods were more likely to administer shock than those who wore name tags. (Diener et al., 1976) Trick-or-treaters in groups more likely to steal extra candy than individual kids, unless they were individuated by being asked their names. (Johnson & Downing, 1979) Women put on nurses� uniforms before deciding how much shock someone should receive. When those wearing the nurses� uniforms were made anonymous, they became less aggressive in adminstering shocks than when their names and personal identities were made public. The internet has provided new ways in which people can communicate with each other anonymously. Just as research on deindividuation predicts, in these settings people often feel free to say things they would never dream of saying if they could be identified. There are advantages to free and open discussion of difficult topics, but the cost seems to be a reduction in common civility. What kinds of experiences have you personally had of being deindividuated? What kinds of experiences that occur in our society tend to deindividuate us? What kinds of behavior have you observed that might have occurred because people were deindividuated? What are the effects of wearing uniforms? If you could be totally invisible for 24 hours and were completely assured that you would not be detected or held responsible for your actions, what would you do? (Mann, 1981) More suicide baiting at night, larger crowds, moderate distance to victim. (Zimbardo, 1969) Participants who wore white hoods were more likely to administer shock than those who wore name tags. (Diener et al., 1976) Trick-or-treaters in groups more likely to steal extra candy than individual kids, unless they were individuated by being asked their names. (Johnson & Downing, 1979) Women put on nurses� uniforms before deciding how much shock someone should receive. When those wearing the nurses� uniforms were made anonymous, they became less aggressive in adminstering shocks than when their names and personal identities were made public.

17. Group Decisions:Are Two (or More) Heads Better Than One? Large groups are smarter than individuals, if group members are allowed to work separately and contribute separate ideas. Several factors can cause groups to make worse decisions than individuals. Process Loss Any aspect of group interaction that inhibits good problem solving. Many people working independently, all getting their own information, often produce a surprisingly accurate average (e.g., on the television show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, polling the studio audience yielded the right answer 91% of the time, while calling an expert produced the answer 65% of the time), if someone can pull together than information. But group members don�t work separately and contribute their separate ideas. Rather, they interact, which raises the likelihood that some will feel left out, will defer to the opinions of others, will be too shy to criticize the group, or in other ways will hold back from contributing what they can.Many people working independently, all getting their own information, often produce a surprisingly accurate average (e.g., on the television show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, polling the studio audience yielded the right answer 91% of the time, while calling an expert produced the answer 65% of the time), if someone can pull together than information. But group members don�t work separately and contribute their separate ideas. Rather, they interact, which raises the likelihood that some will feel left out, will defer to the opinions of others, will be too shy to criticize the group, or in other ways will hold back from contributing what they can.

18. Failure to Share Unique Information Groups tend to focus on the information they share and ignore facts known to only some members of the group. Stasser and Titus, 1985 Stasser and Titus (1985) told a group of participants to decide which of two job candidates should be hired. Each member of the group was given some information about the two candidates. There were 7 reasons to hire Anderson and only 4 reasons to hire Baker, and the group had all of the reasons � the committee should have chosen Anderson. Yet most groups chose Baker, the weaker candidate. Why? The answer lies in how the information was distributed. The researchers gave each member of the group the 4 reasons for choosing Baker, but they gave each person only 1 reason for choosing Anderson. Each person got a different reason for choosing Anderson, so if the committee members managed to pool their knowledge, they would realize there were more reasons to hire Anderson. After all, that is how committees are supposed to work, by brining together all of the information held by the various members. But they didn�t manage to pool their information. Instead of talking about all 7 different reasons for hiring Anderson, they mostly talked about the 4 reasons for hiring Baker. That is, the group focused on what they all knew they had in common, rather than on unique information each person had. Subsequent research has focused on ways to get groups to focus more on unshared information: Group discussions should last long enough to get beyond what everyone already knows. Another approach is to assign different group members to specific areas of expertise so that they know that they alone are responsible for certain types of information. Stasser and Titus (1985) told a group of participants to decide which of two job candidates should be hired. Each member of the group was given some information about the two candidates. There were 7 reasons to hire Anderson and only 4 reasons to hire Baker, and the group had all of the reasons � the committee should have chosen Anderson. Yet most groups chose Baker, the weaker candidate. Why? The answer lies in how the information was distributed. The researchers gave each member of the group the 4 reasons for choosing Baker, but they gave each person only 1 reason for choosing Anderson. Each person got a different reason for choosing Anderson, so if the committee members managed to pool their knowledge, they would realize there were more reasons to hire Anderson. After all, that is how committees are supposed to work, by brining together all of the information held by the various members. But they didn�t manage to pool their information. Instead of talking about all 7 different reasons for hiring Anderson, they mostly talked about the 4 reasons for hiring Baker. That is, the group focused on what they all knew they had in common, rather than on unique information each person had. Subsequent research has focused on ways to get groups to focus more on unshared information: Group discussions should last long enough to get beyond what everyone already knows. Another approach is to assign different group members to specific areas of expertise so that they know that they alone are responsible for certain types of information.

19. Group Decision Making Group Think: The tendency of members of highly cohesive groups to assume that their decisions can�t be wrong, that all members must support the group�s decision strongly, and that contrary information should be ignored

20. Group Decision Making Causes of Group Think: Cohesiveness Emergent group norms Norms suggesting that the group is moral and infallible Biased Processing of Information Groups motivated to find reasons to support their views rather than seeking truth and accuracy Groups Often Fail to Pool Information Focus on Information all members already know Devil�s Advocate Technique and Authentic Dissent ameliorate such tendencies

21. Perhaps that was the problem with Kennedy and his advisers when they decided to invade Cuba; they were more concerned with maintaining morale than with rocking the boat. Kennedy and his advisers were riding high on their close victory in the 1960 election and were a tight-knit, homogeneous group. Since they had not yet made any major policy decisions, they lacked well-developed methods for discussing the issues. Moreover, Kennedy made it clear that he favored the invasion, and he asked the group to consider only details of how it should be executed instead of questioning whether it should proceed at all. Arthur Schlesinger, one of Kennedy�s advisers, reported that he had severe doubts about the Bay of Pigs invasion but did not express these concerns during the discussions out of a fear that �others would regard it as presumptuous of him, a college professor, to take issue with august heads of major government institutions� (Janis, 1982, p. 32). If anyone does voice a contrary viewpoint, the rest of the group is quick to criticize, pressuring the person to conform to the majority view. Schlesinger did share some of his doubts with Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. When Robert Kennedy, the attorney general and the president�s brother, got wind of this, he took Schlesinger aside at a party and told him that the president had made up his mind to go ahead with the invasion and that his friends should support him. This kind of behavior creates an illusion of unanimity, where it looks as if everyone agrees. On the day the group voted on whether to invade, President Kennedy asked all those present for their opinion�except Arthur Schlesinger. Perhaps that was the problem with Kennedy and his advisers when they decided to invade Cuba; they were more concerned with maintaining morale than with rocking the boat. Kennedy and his advisers were riding high on their close victory in the 1960 election and were a tight-knit, homogeneous group. Since they had not yet made any major policy decisions, they lacked well-developed methods for discussing the issues. Moreover, Kennedy made it clear that he favored the invasion, and he asked the group to consider only details of how it should be executed instead of questioning whether it should proceed at all. Arthur Schlesinger, one of Kennedy�s advisers, reported that he had severe doubts about the Bay of Pigs invasion but did not express these concerns during the discussions out of a fear that �others would regard it as presumptuous of him, a college professor, to take issue with august heads of major government institutions� (Janis, 1982, p. 32). If anyone does voice a contrary viewpoint, the rest of the group is quick to criticize, pressuring the person to conform to the majority view. Schlesinger did share some of his doubts with Dean Rusk, the secretary of state. When Robert Kennedy, the attorney general and the president�s brother, got wind of this, he took Schlesinger aside at a party and told him that the president had made up his mind to go ahead with the invasion and that his friends should support him. This kind of behavior creates an illusion of unanimity, where it looks as if everyone agrees. On the day the group voted on whether to invade, President Kennedy asked all those present for their opinion�except Arthur Schlesinger.

22. Avoiding the Groupthink Trap A wise leader can take several steps to avoid groupthink: Remain impartial, Seek outside opinions, Create subgroups, Seek anonymous opinions. Fortunately, President Kennedy learned from his mistakes with the Bay of Pigs decision, and when he encountered his next major foreign policy decision, the Cuban missile crisis, he took many of these steps to avoid groupthink. When his advisers met to decide what to do about the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Kennedy often absented himself from the group so as not to inhibit discussion. He also brought in outside experts (e.g., Adlai Stevenson) who were not members of the in-group. That Kennedy successfully negotiated the removal of the Soviet missiles was almost certainly due to the improved methods of group decision making he adopted. Fortunately, President Kennedy learned from his mistakes with the Bay of Pigs decision, and when he encountered his next major foreign policy decision, the Cuban missile crisis, he took many of these steps to avoid groupthink. When his advisers met to decide what to do about the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Kennedy often absented himself from the group so as not to inhibit discussion. He also brought in outside experts (e.g., Adlai Stevenson) who were not members of the in-group. That Kennedy successfully negotiated the removal of the Soviet missiles was almost certainly due to the improved methods of group decision making he adopted.

23. Group Decision Making Basic Nature of Group Polarization: Group polarization is the tendency of group members to shift toward more extreme positions

24. Group Decision Making Causes of Group Polarization: Social comparison processes operate to make everyone in the group want to appear above the average of the group Most arguments presented center around the groups original preference, thereby leading members to feel convinced that they hold the right view