An evolutionary game approach to culture: Illustration by an adaptive norm development. Tatsuya Kameda (Hokkaido University) [email protected] http://lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp/members/kameda. CEFOM/21, 2nd Workshop Culture, Norm, and Evolution Hokkaido University, Aug. 6-8, 2003.
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“Social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws. These norms emerge out of interaction with others; they may or may not be stated explicitly, and any sanctions for deviating from them come from social networks, not the legal system” (p.152).
Acquirer with a resource of value uncertaintyV (e.g., hunted meat)
Depending on behavioral strategies, some individuals may demand communal sharing of the resource. Refusal of the acquirer to share the resource leads to fights that may incur cost C to each loser.Key Question: Can communal sharers outperform other types of members inthe population?
Evolvable from nearly zero
“Lukewarm” norm-enforcers the population
(1st -order free riders)
Tolerant toward the lukewarm members (2nd-order free riders)
Conceptually parallel patterns were also obtained with American samples (see Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, & Smith, 2002)