An evolutionary game approach to culture: Illustration by an adaptive norm development. Tatsuya Kameda (Hokkaido University) email@example.com http://lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp/members/kameda. CEFOM/21, 2nd Workshop Culture, Norm, and Evolution Hokkaido University, Aug. 6-8, 2003.
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An evolutionary game approach to culture:Illustration by an adaptive norm development
Tatsuya Kameda (Hokkaido University)
CEFOM/21, 2nd Workshop
Culture, Norm, and Evolution
Hokkaido University, Aug. 6-8, 2003
“Social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws. These norms emerge out of interaction with others; they may or may not be stated explicitly, and any sanctions for deviating from them come from social networks, not the legal system” (p.152).
Acquirer with a resource of value V (e.g., hunted meat)
Depending on behavioral strategies, some individuals may demand communal sharing of the resource. Refusal of the acquirer to share the resource leads to fights that may incur cost C to each loser.
Evolvable from nearly zero
(1st -order free riders)
Tolerant toward the lukewarm members (2nd-order free riders)
Conceptually parallel patterns were also obtained with American samples (see Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, & Smith, 2002)