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Adversary/Defender Model of Risk of Terrorist Attacks using BeliefPowerPoint Presentation

Adversary/Defender Model of Risk of Terrorist Attacks using Belief

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### Adversary/Defender Modelof Risk of Terrorist Attacks using Belief

SAND 2006-1470C

Risk Symposium 2006

Risk Analysis for Homeland Security and Defense:

Theory and Application

March 20, 2006

John Darby

Sandia National Laboratories

505-284-7862

Acknowledgments

- Linguistic Model for Adversary
- Logic Evolved Decision (LED) Methodology developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by Terry Bott and Steve Eisenhawer
- Belief/Plausibility measure of uncertainty added

- Numerical Model for Defender
- Uses work and suggestions from Jon Helton, Arizona State University

- Belief/Plausibility with Fuzzy Sets
- 1986 paper by Ronald Yager

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Goal

- Apply Belief/Plausibility Measure of Uncertainty to Evaluating Risk from Acts of Terrorism
- Why Belief/Plausibility?
- We have considerable epistemic (state of knowledge) uncertainty
- Terrorists acts are not random events, but we have considerable epistemic uncertainty for evaluating them

- We have considerable epistemic (state of knowledge) uncertainty

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Random vs. Intentional

- Random event: Earthquake
- Magnitude of earthquake independent of structures exposed to earthquake
- Event is a “dumb” failure

- Intentional Event: Terrorist Blow Up Building
- Are the Consequences worth the effort to gather the resources to be able to defeat any security systems in place and destroy the building
- Event is a choice by a thinking, malevolent adversary with significant resources

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Safety Risk (Random)

Likelihood

Likelihood

Maximum Risk

Maximum Risk

(Uncertainty)

(Uncertainty)

Consequence

Consequence

Safety Risk vs. Terrorist Risk[email protected] 505-284-7862

Belief/Plausibility for Epistemic Uncertainty

- Toss a fair coin
- Uncertainty is aleatory (random)
- Probability Heads is ½
- Probability Tails is ½

- But if we do not know coin is fair
- May be two-headed or two-tailed
- Epistemic (state of knowledge) uncertainty
- Insufficient information to assign Probability to Heads and Tails
- Belief/Plausibility for Heads is 0/1
- Belief/Plausibility for Tails is 0/1

- With more information (actually tossing the coin) we can reduce Epistemic Uncertainty
- For Fair Coin we cannot reduce aleatory uncertainty

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Belief and Plausibility

- Belief / Plausibility form a Lower / Upper Bound for Probability
- Belief is what probability will be
- Plausibility is what probability could be
- Similar to a Confidence Interval for a Parameter of a probability distribution; a confidence measure that parameter is in interval, but exactly where in interval is not known
- Belief/Plausibility both reduce to Probability if Evidence is Specific

Plausibility

Probability is somewhere in [Belief, Plausibility] Interval

Belief

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Fuzzy Sets for Vagueness

- Consequences (Deaths) are “Major”
- “Major” is fuzzy: between about 500 and about 5000 deaths

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Adversary/Defender

- Adversary (them)
- Defender (us)
- Adversary and Defender each have different goals and different states of knowledge
- Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence
- Defender goal: Minimize Risk with available resources
- Adversary goal: Maximize Consequence with available resources (working assumption)

- Adversary is the Threat
- Epistemic Uncertainty for Vulnerability and Consequence

- Defender knows Vulnerability and Consequence
- Epistemic Uncertainty for Threat

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Scenario and Dependence

- Scenario defined as: Specific Target, Adversary Resources and Attack Plan
- Resources are: attributes (numbers weapons, etc.) and knowledge

- Risk for a Scenario
- Risk = f x P x C
- f is frequency of scenario (number per year)
- P is probability scenario is successful
- C is consequence

- P is conditional on scenario (adversary resources and security in place, both physical security and intelligence gathering)
- C is conditional on scenario (target)
- Risk is scenario dependent
- Adversary has choice (not random event)
- Risk must consider millions of scenarios

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Defender Model for a Scenario

- Risk = f x P x C
- f, P, and C are random variables with uncertainty
- Degrees of Evidence to f, P, C based on state of knowledge
- Convolution using Belief/Plausibility Measure of Uncertainty

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Example Result from Defender Model

Probability assumes evidence for an interval uniformly distributed over interval

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Scenarios: Ranked

By Decreasing Expected Value

Best

0

106

Expected Value of Deaths per Year: f*P*C

Defender Ranking of Scenarios- For Belief/Plausibility Expected Value is an Interval [Elow, Ehigh]. Reduces to point (Mean) for Probability
- Rank by Ehigh, Subrank by Elow

Scenario

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Likelihood: f

0

Expected Value of Deaths: P*C

106

Next Level Of Detail for Defender Ranking[email protected] 505-284-7862

Adversary Model

- Use surrogate Adversary (Special Forces)
- Adversary has Choice
- All Variables of concern must be “OK” or
we will pick another scenario

- Recruit Insider? Not unless already placed
- Large Team? Concern about being detected by Intelligence
- Uncertainty?
- Door was green yesterday, is red today…What else changed?

- All Variables of concern must be “OK” or
- Variables for Adversary Decision are Not all Numeric
- Consequence = Deaths x Economic Damage x Fear in Populace x Damage to National Security x Religious Significance x …..
- Deaths and Economic Damage are numeric
- Fear in Populace, Damage to National Security, and Religious Significance are not numeric

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Adversary Model

- Linguistic Model
- Develop Fuzzy Sets for Each Variable
- Develop Approximate Reasoning Rule Base for Linguistic Convolution of Variables to Reflect Scenario Selection Decision Process (LANL LED process)
- We are not the Adversary, we try to think like the Adversary
- Considerable Epistemic Uncertainty
- Use Belief/Plausibility Measure of Uncertainty Propagated up the Rule Base

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Adversary Model

- Assume Adversary Goal is Maximize Expected Consequence
- Expected Consequence ≡ P x C
- Expected Consequence is Adversary estimate of Consequence, C, weighted by Adversary estimate of Probability of Success, P

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Example of Adversary Model

- Rule Base and Variables
- Expected Consequence = Probability Of (Adversary) Success x Consequence
- Probability Of Success = Probability Resources Required Gathered Without Detection x Probability Information Required Can Be Obtained x
Probability Physical Security System can be Defeated

- Consequence = Deaths x Damage To National Security

- Fuzzy Sets
- Expected Consequence = {No, Maybe, Yes}
- Probability Of Success = {Low, Medium, High}
- Consequence = {Small, Medium, Large}
- Probability Resources Required Gathered Without Detection =
- {Low, Medium, High}
- Probability Information Required Can Be Obtained = {Low, Medium, High}
- Probability Physical Security System can be Defeated = {Low, Medium, High}
- Deaths = {Minor, Moderate, Major, Catastrophic}
- Damage To National Security = {Insignificant, Significant, Very Significant}

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Example of Adversary Model

- Focal Elements (Evidence) for Particular Scenario
- Deaths: 0.8 for {Major, Catastrophic}
- 0.2 for {Moderate, Major}
- Damage To National Security: 0.1 to {Insignificant, Significant}
0.9 to {Significant, Very Significant}

- Probability Resources Required Obtained Without Detection:
0.7 to {Medium}

0.3 to {Medium, High}

- Probability Information Required can Be Obtained:
0.15 to {Medium}

0.85 to {Medium, High}

- Probability Physical Security System can be Defeated:
1.0 to {Medium, High}

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Example of Adversary Model

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Example of Adversary Model

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Example of Adversary Model

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Adversary Ranking of Scenarios

- Defender thinking like Adversary Ranks by Plausibility
- Rank scenarios based on the plausibility for the worst fuzzy set for expected consequence, “Yes” in the prior example, sub-ranked by plausibility of the next-worst fuzzy sets, “Maybe” and “No” in the prior example

- Note: Actual Adversary using the Model would Rank by Belief
- “We will not attempt a scenario unless we believe it will succeed”… Osama

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Software Tools

- Numerical Evaluation of Risk for Defender
- BeliefConvolution Java code (written by author)
- RAMAS RiskCalc

- Linguistic Evaluation for Adversary
- LinguisticBelief Java code (written by author)
- LANL LEDTools

[email protected] 505-284-7862

“Combinatorics” Issue for Convolution with Belief/Plausibility

- Convolution using Belief/Plausibility must be done at the focal element level
- Convolution of 20 variables each with 3 focal elements results in a variable with 320 focal elements

- Need to Condense or Aggregate Degrees of Evidence for Large Scale Problems
- Must “condense” or “aggregate” focal elements with repeated convolution of variables to reduce number of focal elements to manageable size

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Evidence Belief/Plausibility

Aggregated

Evidence

*

Bins (linear or log10)

Aggregation in BeliefConvolution Code[email protected] 505-284-7862

Aggregation in LinguisticBelief Code Belief/Plausibility

- Aggregation is “Automatic” per Rule Base
- Focal Elements for Inputs are on Fuzzy Sets For Input variables
- Focal Elements for Output are on Fuzzy Sets of Output Variable

- Happiness = Health x Wealth x Outlook on Life
- Assume Health, Wealth, and Outlook on Life
each have 3 focal elements: implies Health x Wealth x Outlook on Life has 27 focal elements

- Happiness = {Not So Good, OK, Good}
- Evidence on Happiness is aggregated on subsets of
{Not So Good, OK, Good} so Happiness has at most

23 = 8 Focal Elements

- Assume Health, Wealth, and Outlook on Life

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Assumptions Belief/Plausibility

- Focal Elements for Different Variables are Noninteracting for Convolution with Belief/Plausibility (independent for Probability)
- SAND2004-3072 “Dependence in Probabilistic Modeling, Dempster-Shafer Theory, and Probability Boxes”, Ferson et al, Oct. 2004

- Adversary Goal is to Maximize Expected Consequence
- Don’t like this goal? Change the rule base!

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Future Work Belief/Plausibility

- How Consider Millions of Scenarios?
- Binning and Screening Criteria
- Can reason at any level if honest about uncertainty
- What are # deaths from a terrorist attack? [0, 6x109]

- Use binning/filtering process at successively finer levels of detail, but capture uncertainty at each step

- Dependence? Risk will always be dependent on scenarios
- Implement Monte-Carlo Sampling with Belief/Plausibility (work by Helton et al)
- Eliminates problem of dependence from a repeated variable that cannot be factored
- Automate evaluation of large scale problems

[email protected] 505-284-7862

Summary Belief/Plausibility

- Adversary and Defender have Different States of Knowledge
- Defender wants to Minimize Risk
- Adversary wants to Maximize Expected Consequence (working assumption)
- Adversary selection of Scenarios(s) is not random
- Large Epistemic Uncertainty for Defender
- Use Belief/Plausibility Measure instead of Probabililty Measure

- Adversary selects Scenario(s) with “high” ranking
- Defender thinks like adversary using linguistics
- Linguistic variables modeled with Fuzzy Sets

- Adversary/Defender Models Developed
- Implemented in Java software

[email protected] 505-284-7862

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