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PLATO Society

PLATO Society. Shi’ism and Theocratic Governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran January 18-February 22, 2019 Peter Krug Meeting Five (Feb. 15, 2019): IRI Governance, 1989-2005: Theocratic Islamism, Pragmatism, and Reformism. Today’s class :.

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  1. PLATO Society Shi’ism and Theocratic Governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran January 18-February 22, 2019 Peter Krug Meeting Five (Feb. 15, 2019): IRI Governance, 1989-2005: Theocratic Islamism, Pragmatism, and Reformism

  2. Today’s class: • Weeks 3-4 were about the construction of the theocratic state -- -- its ideological foundations and institutional structures. • Today’s session will be about theocratic Islamists’ use of those structures to respond to perceived challenges from advocates of religious and political reform.

  3. Points From Week Four: • The IRI: a complex, shifting array of power centers • Competing orientations: • Theocratic Islamism (clerical supervision) • Populist Islamism (social goals) • Pragmatism (developmental state) • Reformism (democratic elements)

  4. Key Points for the 1989-2005 Period: • Embedding of Islamic state institutions (particularly the Supreme Leader); • Their interaction with democratic constitutional institutions (Parliament and Presidency); and • Religious and political ideas: increasing diversity and counter-reaction.

  5. Timeline, 1989-2005 • June, 1989: Death of Ruhollah Khomeini; Ali Khamenei the new Supreme Leader • July, 1989: Constitutional amendments adopted in national referendum

  6. Timeline, 1989-2005 (continuing): • 1989-1997: Presidency of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani; a pragmatic governance agenda and theocratic Islamist pushback • 1990’s: Intense debate over new religious and political ideas

  7. Timeline, 1989-2005 (continuing): • 1997-2005: Presidency of Mohammad Khatami; a reformist governance agenda • 2003-2005: Reformist setbacks in local, Parliamentary, and Presidential elections

  8. Today’s Outline: • Post-1989 Institutions of the IRI • Challenges to the system: 1990’s • Within the clerical estate • New ideas within the clerical estate and society at large • Governance, 1989-2005 • Pragmatism and opposition, 1989-1997 • Reformism and opposition, 1997-2005

  9. Post-1989 IRI Institutions • “Unique clericalism”: a system of clerical collective rule under a “clerical monarch” (S.A. Arjomand’s terms) • Clerics in key governmental positions • “Clerical monarchy”: a constitutional regime, under leadership of the Supreme Leader

  10. The Supreme Leader • Under the Amended Constitution, no longer required to be a “source of imitation”, but still must be a cleric

  11. Ali Khamenei (born 1939)

  12. Supreme Leader Khamenei: biographical information • Born in 1939 into a clerical family • Seminary training in Mashhad and Qom • Imprisoned under the Shah’s regime • President of the IRI, 1981-89 • Member, Assembly of Leadership Experts, 1983-89 • Member, Expediency Council, 1988-89 • Supreme Leader since 1989

  13. Supreme Leader Khamenei • Khamenei’s 30 years in office: • Remarkable stability at the top of the system • Testimony to his political skills

  14. The Office of the Supreme Leader • The Office of the Supreme Leader exercises broad and deep governmental powers: • Appointment to other constitutional organs; • Appointment and supervision over the governmental apparatus • Insulated from investigation

  15. The Supreme Leader: Economic Resources • Controls vast economic resources: • Substantial state budget • Supported by a network of economic foundations [bonyads] • Conglomerates of enterprises and real estate holdings that the revolutionary regime expropriated in 1979

  16. Office of the Supreme Leader • A huge supervisory bureaucracy • An extensive patronage network

  17. Supreme Leader’s Powers Include: • Appointment and Dismissal of Members of Other Constitutional Organs: • Council of Guardians • The six religious scholars • Expediency Council • All members

  18. Supreme Leader’s Additional Appointment Powers • Appointment and dismissal of heads of other key governmental agencies, directly responsible to the Supreme Leader: • Judiciary • Special Court for Clerics

  19. The Special Court for Clerics • Under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Leader • Is outside the judiciary agency • Khamenei commissioned an ordinance for the Special Court • Originally one location (Tehran), but now ten other branches • Has its own prison network

  20. Other Powers of Appointment and Supervision • Military and security services: • Revolutionary Guards (and Mobilization Corps (Basij)) • Joint Chiefs of Military Staff; • Armed forces commanders • Intelligence agencies

  21. Other Powers of Appointment and Supervision • Public information: • IRI Radio and Television • Provincial Friday Prayer Leaders

  22. Friday Prayer Leaders • Counterparts to provincial governors • Highly influential: a mechanism for political mobilization

  23. Friday Prayer Leaders • A department within the Supreme Leader’s Office: • Coordinates the content of Friday Prayer sermons • Publishes weekly bulletins containing the talking points for the local imams

  24. Insulated From Investigation • In 1997, the Expediency Council ruled that Parliament lacks power to investigate all organs under the SL’s control

  25. Clerical Institutional Structures: • Assembly of Leadership Experts: • Chief responsibility: selection and supervision of the Supreme Leader • Popularly elected, but candidates vetted by the Council of Guardians

  26. Clerical Institutional Structures: • Council of Guardians: • Guards the ideological foundations of the system • Control of parliamentary legislation • Vetting of candidates for elective offices, including Parliament and Presidency

  27. Clerical Institutional Structures: • Expediency Council: • Advisory council to the Supreme Leader • Membership (all appointed by the Supreme Leader) includes the six religious scholars of the Council of Guardians

  28. Expediency Council: • Has authority to determine major state policies, including enactment of legislation (in the “public interest”) • Its legislation not subject to parliamentary review

  29. Challenges to the System: the Clerical Estate in the 1990’s • Continuing opposition to “Guardianship of the Jurist” doctrine and its implications for religious governance • Resistance to centralization of the clerical hierarchy, including standardized tests for promotions • Much resistance in Qom seminaries

  30. Qom Seminary

  31. Qom Seminary

  32. The Initiative for a Single “Source of Imitation” • In 1993-1994, the regime sought to receive approval from leading scholars in the clerical estate for recognition of Supreme Leader Khamenei as the sole “Source of Imitation” in Iran.

  33. According to one of this initiative’s proponents, Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, the system of multiple sources of imitation had been acceptable before the creation of the IRI, but was intolerable now that an Islamic state was in place.

  34. Yazdi: a single source needed “to guard the sovereignty of Islam.” • Centralization and unification of religious and political authority were needed for the preservation of the Islamic state.

  35. At the leading Qom seminary, the religious scholars refused to agree to this proposition. • Instead, they nominated seven religious scholars (including Khamenei) to be sources of imitation.

  36. Challenges to the System: New Ideas in the 1990s • Within the clerical estate: the formulation of Islamic law norms • Through the centuries, although Shi’ite scholars more receptive than their Sunni counterparts to recognition of new legal norms, they still based their interpretations on traditional legal sources and interpretive methods.

  37. While this allowed for new interpretations, it did not leave much room for incorporation of new intellectual trends from outside Shi’ism. • In the 1990’s, however, some religious scholars were starting to incorporate new ideas: for example, democracy and international human rights.

  38. Mohsen Kadivar (born 1959) • Recognized as a mujtahid in 1997 (degree from Qom Seminary); Ph.D. from a Tehran University in 1999. • Taught Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy at Qom Seminary for 14 years.

  39. Kadivar’s Views • Very critical of the “guardianship of the jurist” • Instead, he believes that the general authority of the believer should be the basis for the political philosophy of Islam during the occultation of the Imam.

  40. Kadivar’s Views • He also has worked to develop new interpretations of Islamic law. • Kadivar: Islam should incorporate human rights -- “an interpretation of Islam that is in concord with the freedom of religion and belief that has been mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.

  41. Toward “Democratic Islam”: Shabestari and Soroush • Meanwhile, in the 1990’s, other authors had been developing a different approach • Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (born 1936) • Abdolkarim Soroush (born 1945)

  42. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari

  43. Shabestari is a cleric • As a student at Qom Seminary, he studied under, among others, Ayatollah Khomeini. • He was a professor of Islamic philosophy at the University of Tehran from 1985-2006, teaching comparative religion

  44. Abdolkarim Soroush • Soroush is a layperson: not a cleric. • However, some authors have compared him to Martin Luther • In Iran, he earned an undergraduate degree in pharmacology, then studied chemistry, and then history and philosophy of science, at London University in the 1970’s.

  45. Abdolkarim Soroush • Returned to Iran at the time of the revolution and became an important figure in the Cultural Revolution in the early 1980’s. • Took part in significant curriculum and personnel changes in universities. • Then became a professor at several different universities.

  46. Toward “Democratic Islam” • Shabestari and Soroush worked separately on developing their views, but I will seek to combine them.

  47. Rather than focusing on developing a new Islamic jurisprudence within the contours of traditional inquiry, they employed a relativist approach • Based on historical and linguistic context of the traditional sources of Islam

  48. The norms of religious law (including Islamic law) do not remain static • Instead, they are historically contingent, with their meaning depending on the historical context in which they were formulated

  49. Therefore, Islam must be pluralistic: it must evolve based on recognition of the fact that world views and circumstances change in different historical eras. • The current era is one of democratization and Islam must be viewed in that perspective, recognizing plurality of interpretations

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