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Overview: Arms Control and Nonproliferation in East Asia. Dr. Jing-dong Yuan, EANP Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies October 2003. Current Issues and Challenges . Historical Background Current Capabilities Ongoing Challenges

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overview arms control and nonproliferation in east asia

Overview: Arms Control and Nonproliferation in East Asia

Dr. Jing-dong Yuan, EANP

Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International StudiesOctober 2003

current issues and challenges
Current Issues and Challenges
  • Historical Background
  • Current Capabilities
  • Ongoing Challenges
  • Possible Arms Control Measures
regional tension history
Regional Tension: History
  • Historical legacies of WWII
    • Japanese aggression and aftermath
  • Divided states (Korea, China/Taiwan)
    • Cold War left-overs
  • Territorial conflicts
    • South/East Asian Islands
  • Changing power relations
    • Chinese military modernization
    • US-Japan-South Korea relations
    • Increasing interdependence
northeast asia security and arms control issues
NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
  • Territorial
    • PRC - Japan: Diaoyu Islands
    • Japan-Korea: Takeshima Islands
    • Russia - Japan: Kurile Islands Sovereignty
  • Sovereignty
    • PRC – Taiwan
    • North Korea - South Korea
  • Proliferation
    • North Korea – Nuclearization
    • North Korea - Export of WMD items
    • United States - Theater missle defense
    • China - Items to South Asia and middle East
    • Dual-use technology
  • Other
    • US - Japan defense agreement
    • US - Taiwan: Taiwan Relations Act
wmd capacity in ne asia north korea
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: North Korea
  • Withdrew from NPT
  • Nuclear weapons capabilities
    • Unaccounted fissile material for 1-3 weapons
    • Secret uranium enrichment program admitted to Oct 2002
    • Not yet tested NW, but has done high explosive tests
    • Potential for significant arsenal in 1-2 years
wmd capacity in ne asia north korea6
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: North Korea
  • Ballistic missile capabilities
    • Scud B and Cs
    • No-dong MRBMs
    • Taepo-dong 1,2,3 under development
    • Miniaturization of nuclear warhead still in question
  • Proliferation Threat
    • Missile exports seen as income earner
wmd capacity in ne asia china
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: China
  • Nuclear weapons capabilities
    • Recognized Nuclear Weapon State
    • First nuclear test 1964
    • Last test 1996
    • Extensive nuclear weapons capability
    • Acceded to NPT, Signed CTBT
    • Member, Zangger Committee
    • NWFZs, NFU Doctrine, Security Assurances
wmd capacity in ne asia china8
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: China
  • Ballistic missiles capabilities
    • 400 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in Fujian
    • Approx. 90 MRBMs (DF-3 and DF-21/21A)
    • Approx. 20 IRBMs (DF-4)
    • Approx. 20 ICBMs (DF-5)
    • Not member of MTCR, but export controls coincide with regime
wmd capacity in ne asia japan
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: Japan
  • No WMD programs
    • CBW programs in WWII
    • Potential capability to produce nuclear weapons and missiles in relatively short time
  • Nuclear capabilities
    • Party to NPT and CTBT; Member, NSG and Zangger Committee
    • After WWII, ‘nuclear allergy’
    • Recent debate about nuclear future
    • Controversial nuclear energy program and plutonium stockpiles
wmd capacity in ne asia japan10
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: Japan
  • Ballistic missile capacity
    • Space launch vehicle program
    • May 2003 launched spy satellites
    • Still lacks some key technologies for missiles
    • Member MTCR
  • Missile defense
    • Aegis Destroyers
    • Expanding BMD cooperation with U.S.
wmd capacity in ne asia south korea
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: South Korea
  • Nuclear capacity
    • Nuclear weapons program stopped in mid-1980s under US pressure
    • Member NPT, CTBT
    • Signed, but never fully implemented, the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of The Korean Peninsula”
    • Extensive nuclear energy industry
wmd capacity in ne asia south korea12
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: South Korea
  • CBW capabilities
    • Ratified CWC and BWC
    • Declared CW program in 1997
    • Concerns about CBW capabilities of North
    • Well-developed pharmaceutical and biotech infrastructure
  • Ballistic missile capabilities
    • Building SRBMs up to MTCR limits
    • Member, MTCR
    • Developing SLVs
wmd capacity in ne asia taiwan
WMD Capacity in NE Asia: Taiwan
  • Nuclear capabilities
    • Nuclear weapons program stopped in mid-1980s under US pressure
    • Developed nuclear energy program
  • Ballistic missile capabilities
    • Had ballistic missile programs in past
    • SRBM Tien Chi, first test-fired in 1997
      • Solid-fueled, two-stage missile with a 300 km range that can reach China’s southeastern coast
  • Missile Defense
    • Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) systems
    • Potentially seeking advanced missile defense
      • PAC-3 systems and Aegis radar-equipped destroyers
the north korean nuclear crisis
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
  • Programs began in the 1950s
  • Signed NPT in 1985; IAEA safeguards agreement 1992
  • 1993-1994 nuclear crisis
  • 1994 Agreed Framework and key provisions
  • October 2002 revelation of uranium enrichment programs
the north korean nuclear crisis15
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
  • North Korean nuclear and missile brinkmanship
    • Between 1994 and 2002, Agreed Framework capped North Korea fissile material production
      • Exchange for light-water reactor under construction
      • IAEA verification measures
    • North Korean freeze on ballistic missile flight tests
      • Static engine tests continuing
      • Exports of missiles, missile technology continuing
  • North Korea’s CBW threat
    • Capacity to hit Japan and South Korea
the north korean nuclear crisis16
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
  • Current Crisis
    • October 2002: Admits to secret uranium-enrichment program
    • November 2002: US halts oil shipments to DPRK
    • November 2002: Confusion over apparent admission
    • December 2002: Yemen bound boat stopped
    • December 2002: Breaks seals at Yongbyon; Moves fuel rods; expels IAEA inspectors
the north korean nuclear crisis17
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
  • Current Crisis
    • January 2003: IAEA demands that North Korea readmit inspectors
    • January 2003: North Korea withdraws from NPT
    • January 2003: Fears of reprocessing
    • February 2003: North Korea claims it has reactivated Yongbyon reactor
the north korean nuclear crisis18
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
  • Current Crisis:
    • February/March 2003: North Korea test fires naval missiles
    • April 2003: UNSC expresses concern
    • April 2003: Beijing trilateral talks
    • May to July 2003: Stalemate between US and DPRK; China and other regional players step up diplomacy
    • Six-party talks in Beijing; next round November
north korean nuclear weapons programs
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
  • 5-MWe reactor Yongbyon (1985)
  • 50-MWe reactor (Yongbyon) and 200-MWe reactor (Taechon), both under construction at the time of AF
  • 8,000 spent fuel rods in storage (estimated material for 5 weapons)
  • Uranium enrichment facilities?
north korean capacity in nuclear weapons production
NORTH KOREAN CAPACITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION
  • Plutonium from 1989 extraction (material for 1 to 2 weapons)
  • Reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods in storage (estimated material for 5 weapons)
  • 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor: 5.5 kg plutonium per year (approximately enough for 1 weapon per year)
  • HEU program: approximately 100 kg HEU per year for 6 weapons
  • Completed 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant in Yongbyon-kun: 55 kg of plutonium per year for 7-10 bombs
  • 200MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant located in T\'aech\'on: 220 kg of plutonium per year for 30-40 weapons
us policy toward the dprk
US POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK
  • 1993-1994 negotiation leading to AF
  • 1999 Berlin Agreement on missile test moratorium
  • Marshall Jo Myong-rok’s visit to Washington, DC
  • Albright’s visit to Pyongyang
  • Bush administration’s North Korea policy review; State of Union address and NPR
  • Kelly visit
north korean demands
NORTH KOREAN DEMANDS
  • Nonaggression pact with the US
  • Political recognition
  • Non obstruction of North Korea’s economic development, including removal from terrorist country list, lifting of economic sanctions, and access to int’l financial institutions
  • Economic assistance in exchange of suspension of WMD programs (“satisfy US security concerns”)
us positions options
US POSITIONS & OPTIONS
  • North Korea must dismantle its nuclear weapons programs
  • No bilateral negotiation with Pyongyang
  • Multilateral forum to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue
  • Concerted multinational efforts to pressure North Korea; IAEA/UN resolutions
  • Proliferation Security Initiative
  • Military options
regional reactions
REGIONAL REACTIONS
  • South Korea

- stability; no war; negotiate a peaceful resolution

  • Japan

- peaceful solution; enhance defense; more receptive to sanction measures

  • Russia

- concerned over escalation; seek solution and Russia’s role

  • China

- stability; peaceful solution; NK security concerns addressed

risks of continuing impasse
RISKS OF CONTINUING IMPASSE
  • Pyongyang may move from playing nuclear cards to seriously developing nuclear weapons
  • Continuing impasse gives DPRK time to reprocess fissile materials and HEU for making nuclear bombs
  • North Korea could export nuclear materials
  • Nuclear chain reactions in the region (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan)
risks of military solution
RISKS OF MILITARY SOLUTION
  • Uncertainty about exact locations of nuclear facilities
  • Danger of unleashing all-out war on the peninsula, with massive casualties
  • Pyongyang may resort to WMD use
  • US troops and Japan become targets
  • Economic devastation, environmental degradation and refugee flows
seeking solutions
SEEKING SOLUTIONS

Solution of nuclear crisis requires phased approaches

  • Defuse the nuclear escalation through bilateral/multilateral talks
  • Develop new, comprehensive verifiable arms control & nonproliferation mechanisms
  • US-DPRK ending war status and mutual recognition
  • Multilateral security arrangement
  • International economic & development assistance
regional arms control issues proliferation concerns
Regional Arms Control Issues: Proliferation Concerns
  • China’s previous assistance to Pakistan and North Korea
    • Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, missiles depended heavily on Chinese assistance
    • Some technology continues to flow to Pakistan, North Korea
  • Growing recognition of potential threat to China’s security
regional arms control issues proliferation concerns29
Regional Arms Control Issues: Proliferation Concerns
  • China strengthening export controls
    • New regulations and control lists, 2002
    • Use of ‘catch-all’ clauses
    • Coinciding with NSG, MTCR, Australia Group lists
    • Continuing concerns about domestic capacity
    • Increased US sensitivity about spread of WMD materials has provoked sanctions
    • Seeks reciprocity: Wants limits on US arms sales to Taiwan
regional arms control issues proliferation concerns30
Regional Arms Control Issues: Proliferation Concerns
  • North Korean proliferation threat
    • Important source of DPRK income
    • Supporting Pakistan, Iranian missile programs
    • Concerns about transfers to non-state actors
  • Nuclear domino effect
    • Increases chance of pushing other Asian countries in direction of defenses and deterrents
regional arms control issues reactions to security challenges
Regional Arms Control Issues: Reactions to security challenges
  • Will Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan remain non-nuclear?
    • Japan sees increasing threat from China and North Korea
    • South Korea more relaxed
    • Taiwan feels threatened, but constrained
  • Increasing interest in offensive options to deter, respond to missile threats
regional arms control issues missile defense
Regional Arms Control Issues: Missile Defense
  • Sino-U.S. strategic relations and missile defenses
    • China sees U.S. missile defenses as aimed at China’s deterrent
    • U.S. sees China modernizing and increasing strategic forces
  • U.S. and allies see missile threat from North Korea
  • Potential for negative strategic interactions
possible arms control measures
Possible Arms Control Measures
  • Talks to end current North Korea standoff
    • Questions about format (bilateral vs multilateral)
    • All regional players involved
      • China playing increasingly active role
    • Agreement still looks distant
    • Other options undesirable
      • Sanctions/Blockade
      • Military Action
      • Acceptance of a nuclear North Korea
possible arms control measures34
Possible Arms Control Measures
  • Regional Confidence Building Measures
    • ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
    • NWFZs
  • Strategic restraint
    • Unilateral or reciprocal limits on capabilities
    • Coupled with political efforts to improve relations
  • Strategic dialogue
    • Making force structure interactions clear
    • Transparency about arsenals, intentions
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