Institutions and Economic Growth. 1) Theoretical papers: North 1994 Przeworski and Limongi 1993 2) Empirical papers: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 2004 Sachs 2003 Email: [email protected] Office: B532. 1st seminar: summary of the readings.
Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.
Douglass C. North receives the 1993 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel from King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden.
It is the admixture of formal rules (e.g. constitution), informal norms (e.g. trust), and enforcement characteristics (e.g. police) that shapes economic performance
It is everything…it is nothing?
Informal norms provide “legitimacy” to a set of rules
Legitimacy, Path dependency…concepts in the top ten of problematic terms
(Evans: “embedded autonomy”)
(e.g. Somoza, Trujillo, Marcos and other “personalistic” dictatorships. Here, we see distinction personalistic developmentalist)
The Big Question: What accounts for the differences between the world’s richest and poorest nations?
The 3 Big Answers:
The Big Problem: How to Test Them?
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001
Easterly and Levine 2002
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbis 2002
Geographical and Ecological Variables
(e.g. climate zone, disease ecology,
distance from the coast)