Diamonds and conflict lecture at hei 8 may 2007 course e 586 resource and environmental conflict
1 / 29

Diamonds and conflict - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

  • Updated On :

Diamonds and conflict Lecture at HEI, 8 May 2007 Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict Nils Petter Gleditsch Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) & Department of Sociology and Political Science,

I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Diamonds and conflict' - Anita

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
Diamonds and conflict lecture at hei 8 may 2007 course e 586 resource and environmental conflict l.jpg

Diamonds and conflictLecture at HEI, 8 May 2007Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict

Nils Petter Gleditsch

Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

& Department of Sociology and Political Science,

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Environmental factors in conflict five views l.jpg
Environmental factors in conflict: Five views

  • Neomalthusianism: Resource scarcity leads to conflict

  • Political ecology: It's the distribution of resources!

  • Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity

  • Resource curse: Resource abundance is the problem

  • Institutionalism: Cooperation can overcome ABUNDANCE*

* as well as scarcity, of course

Problems with existing studies l.jpg
Problems with existing studies

  • with the indicators of natural resources

    • do all primary commodities have the same effect?

    • endogeneity

    • are we really measuring underdevelopment?

    • spurious relationship?

  • with the level of measurement

    • national vs. subnational

    • administrative subunits vs. pixels

Priority resources l.jpg
Priority resources

Conlit: Mentioned in the conflict literature

Other metals: Aluminium (Ghana), copper (Zambia), silver (D R Congo), tin (Bolivia), uranium (Niger)

Source: Gilmore et al. (2005), Olsson (2006), and other sources

Determinants of civil war l.jpg
Determinants of civil war

  • Diamonds can –

  • provide income for corrupt governments and a motivation to overthrow them

  • provide economic opportunity for rebel movements through looting and extortion

  • contribute to strengthening the identity of groups that stand to gain from secession or autonomy

  • Motivation

    • greed, grievance

  • Opportunity

    • geographical, economic

  • Identity

    • group formation

Diamond data l.jpg
Diamond data

  • Discovery

  • Production

  • Exports

  • Geological type

  • Location

Diamond production 1990 99 l.jpg
Diamond production, 1990–99

Source: Olsson (2007: Table 1)

Overview of diadata l.jpg

Number of records


Number of countries


% of records with geographic coordinates


Number of countries with production


% of records coded as active mining activity


% of records coded as probable mining activity


Number of countries with no production


% of records coded as no mining activity


% of records coded as unknown mining status


Number of countries with primary deposits


% of records coded as primary diamond deposits


Number of countries with secondary deposits


% of records coded as secondary diamond deposits


Number of countries with marine deposits


% of records coded as marine diamond deposits


% of records coded as unknown geological form


% of all records with known discovery date


% of records with production and known production date


Overview of DIADATA

Source: Gilmore et al. (2005)

Effects of diamonds l.jpg
Effects of diamonds

  • Slow economic growth

  • Factional, predatory state

  • Looting, conflict

Source: Olsson (2006, 2007)

Diamond production and growth 1990 99 l.jpg
Diamond production and growth, 1990–99

Source: Olsson (2003, 2006, 2007)

Diamond disturbances l.jpg
Diamond disturbances

Civil war: Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, D R Congo

Rent seeking, corruption, etc: Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Uganda, Republic of Congo

Funding of terrorism: Hezbollah (through Lebanese traders in Africa)

Source: Olsson (2006: 1140–1141

Mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict l.jpg
Mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict

Greedy rebels

- domestic group engage in quasi-criminal activity

- natural resources increase the value of the state

- bid for secession (where resources are concentrated)

Greedy outsiders

- states

- corporations


- emerging inequalities

- trade shocks

- environmental damage, forced migration

- greater inequality than other resources

Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)

And more mechanisms l.jpg
… and more mechanisms


- funding rebellion through control of production

- selling 'booty futures'

Weak state

- untaxed citizens have little influence over government

- the state fails to create a strong bureaucracy

Sparse networks

- weak manufacturing sector and low internal trade and thus low understanding between cultures

- and seven mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict duration

Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)

Empirical findings l.jpg
Empirical findings

Diamond production per capita positively linked to onset of conflict 1960-99

Both for global sample and Africa sample

In global sample, holds for politically unstable states, for politically strong states, but not for 'Weberian states'

States with natural resources (including diamonds) have shorter conflicts

States with natural resources (including diamonds) experience military victories

More support for grievances and weak state structures than for booty futures and state capture – but cannot distinguish between all mechanisms

Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)

Diamond production and onset of internal armed conflict 1946 2001 l.jpg
Diamond Production andOnset of Internal Armed Conflict, 1946–2001

From: Lujala et al. (2005), For the conflict data, see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and The list of independent states follows Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and the diamonds data are from Gilmore et al. (2005).

Civil war onset and diamonds discovery and production 1946 99 l.jpg
Civil war onset and diamonds– discovery and production, 1946–99

Bivariate results. Conflict data from Fearon & Laitin (2003), diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005).

Internal armed conflict and diamonds 1989 99 l.jpg
Internal armed conflict and diamonds, 1989–99

Bivariate results. Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005).

Multivariate results l.jpg
Multivariate results

Production of primary diamonds not associated with onset, but negatively associated with incidence of civil war 1945-99

Production of secondary diamonds not associated with either onset or incidence

Interaction between secondary production and ethnic fractionalization positively associated with incidence of civil war

Secondary production associated with onset of ethnic war, 1945-99

And particularly after the Cold War

But diamond occurrence not associated with war

Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005).

Diamonds and conflict i l.jpg
Diamonds and conflict I

1989–99. Diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005), conflict data from Buhaug & Gates (2002) and Buhaug & Rød (2006).

Diamonds and conflict ii l.jpg
Diamonds and conflict II

Source: Gilmore et al. (2005: 269)

Diamonds and conflict in africa 1970 2001 a disaggregated analysis l.jpg
Diamonds and conflict in Africa, 1970–2001:A disaggregated analysis

Areas with territorial conflict tend to be further away from secondary diamond locations

Areas with government conflict tend to be closer to secondary diamond locations

This also holds when using control variables

But claims to try to topple the government may be phony – warlords are satisfied with the loot

Source: Buhaug & Rød (2006).

Why some are peaceful others not l.jpg
Why some are peaceful, others not

  • Botswana vs. Sierra Leone

  • Kimberlites vs. alluvial diamonds

  • Kimberlites usually in deserts or Arctic areas, alluvial deposits in rough terrain (jungle)

  • Good institution

  • But what determines the institutions?

  • The role of De Beers

Conflict diamonds l.jpg
Conflict diamonds

  • 'Conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.'

Source: United Nations (2002)

Countermeasures l.jpg

  • UN Security Council 1998, two resolutions that prohibited direct or indirect imports of diamonds from Angola

  • UN Security Council 2000, ban on all imports of diamonds supplied by the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone

  • May 2000, Kimberley meeting

  • December 2000, UN General Assembly votes to create certification scheme

  • 2002, ban on all imports from Liberia, due to links to the RUF

  • 4 May 2007: Sanctions against Liberia lifted

  • Ghana: Diamond exchange under the control of the state

  • D R Congo 2003: assisting small-scale mining sector with a view to bringing it into the formal economy

Kimberley process l.jpg
Kimberley Process

States and organizations satisfying the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as of May 2007









Central African Republic

China, People's Republic of

Congo, Democratic Republic

Cote D' Ivoire


European Community








Korea, Republic of

Lao, Democratic Republic of







New Zealand



Sierra Leone


South Africa

Sri Lanka






United Arab Emirates

United States of America




+ 'Chinese Taipei'

46 + 1 countries/organizations, accounting for 99,8% of the world's production of rough diamonds (

Effective l.jpg

Conflict diamonds from Angola, D R Congo (Kinshasa), Liberia, and Sierra Leone have been smuggled to neighboring countries that are not under sanctions, like Central African Republic, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and re-exported from there

2005–06: Neither Angola (2004), D R Congo (2001), Liberia (2003), Sierra Leone (2000) listed with armed conflict

Source: United Nations (2001b), cited from Olsson (2007). Conflict data from Year in parentheses: Last year with armed conflict > 25 battle deaths, according to Uppsala/PRIO conflict database (

References l.jpg

  • Buhaug & Gates, 2002

  • Buhaug, Halvard & Päivi Lujala, 2005. 'Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War', Political Geography 24(4): 399–418

  • Buhaug, Halvard & Jan Ketil Rød, 2006. 'Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–2001', Political Geography 25(3): 315–335

  • Fearon & Laitin, 2003

  • Gilmore, Elisabeth, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rød, 2005. 'Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset', Conflict Management and Peace Science

  • 22(3): 257–292

  • Gleditsch & Ward, 1999

  • Gleditsch et al., 2002

  • Humphreys, Macartan, 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution – Uncovering the Mechanisms', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508–537

  • Klare, Michael T. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Metropolitan

  • * Lujala, Päivi; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Elisabeth Gilmore, 2005. 'A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4):

  • 538–562

  • Olsson, Ola, 2003. 'Conflict Diamonds', Working paper (86). Gothenburg: Department of Economics, University of Göteborg (earlier version of Olsson, 2007)

  • Olsson, Ola, 2006. 'Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend', World Economy 29(8): 1133–1150

  • Olsson, Ola, 2007. 'Conflict Diamonds', Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 267–286

  • Ross, Michael, 2006. 'A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War', Annual Review of Political Science 9: 265–300

  • United Nations, 2001a. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/357. New York: United Nations

  • United Nations, 2001b. Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/1072. New York: United Nations

  • United Nations, 2002. 'Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War,

  • For material on the Kimberley Process, see

Next week tuesday 15 may l.jpg
Next week: Tuesday 15 May

Water and Conflict, with student presentations by Daniela Fabel, Michael Jakob, Jerome Lacourrege, and Samuel Spörri. Presentation on Angola (postponed from this week) by Andrea Buetler before the lecture).